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PROFESSOR ROBERT H. MUNDHEIM: The subject of today's dis-
cussion calls to mind the time when a friend of mine flew to Phila-
delphia from Florida and the plane on which she was traveling ran
into extremely turbulent weather. Even in the best of weather she
was not a good airplane traveler. And so, in absolute terror and
fright, she turned to the person next to her-a minister-and said:
"Can't you do something?"
He replied, "I'm sorry, Ma'am, but I'm in sales, not manage-
ment."
Sales are the focus of today's discussion, and I would like to
start the discussion by looking at what is probably the most contro-
versial of the Commission's recommendations: namely, that legislation
be enacted which will reduce the sales load from its present norm
of 8.5 per cent of the offering price or 9.3 per cent of the asset value,
to a maximum of 4.6 per cent of the offering price or 5 per cent of
the asset value.'
The premise for the Commission's recommendation is, as it was
with respect to management fees, that there is a lack of competition
at the customer level. The Commission concluded that competition
does not exert any restraint on sales charges to the customer. The
Commission did find competition, but it was competition among
underwriters for dealer favor. This competition, the Commission
found, has created a rise in the sales load charged investors, at least
with respect to purchases under the breakpoint, and an even sharper
rise in the amount of compensation going to the dealer.
It seems significant that the point where some reduction in the
sales charge has occurred is in sales to a volume purchaser. Such
volume purchasers are often customers of some sophistication, who
are aware of, and can be influenced in their investment decisions by
comparative costs.
In addition to pointing out the lack of competition at the customer
level as a justification for governmental interference and setting maxi-
1 Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Public Policy Implications of Investment Coln-
pny Growth, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 223 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as SEC Mutual Fund Report].
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mum price levels, the Commission points, as an additional justification,
to the government protection against retail price competition. The
umbrella of protection against retail price competition is found in
Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act.
2
Under that provision, if the prospectus of Fund A says that the
sale price of shares shall be net asset value plus 83/2 per cent of the
offering price, every dealer must sell that fund's shares at net asset
value plus 8/ 2 per cent of the offering price, even though a particular
dealer may think that he can make an adequate profit by selling the
shares with a sales load of 5 per cent of the offering price.
With that background in mind, I'd like to start by asking
Professor Friend how he evaluates the Commission's approach to the
problem of the level of sales charges.
AN ECONOMIST'S EVALUATION OF THE COMMISSION'S
RECOmMENDATION
DR. IRWIN FRIEND: While I am sympathetic with its purpose,
I have significant reservations about the SEC's recommendation that
new legislation be enacted limiting sales charges of mutual funds to
5 per cent of their net asset value (with this statutory maximum
subject to change by the Commission). The problem the SEC is
attempting to deal with in this matter is very real, and no proposal
is likely to be completely satisfactory. It is even possible that the
Commission's solution may ultimately be necessary, but it involves
a philosophical approach which I feel should be followed only if other
alternatives do not work. It should be noted that the members of
the Wharton School group who worked on the 1962 Study of Mutual
Funds are not unanimous in questioning the desirability of this recom-
mendation by the SEC, so that the views I shall be expressing should
be regarded as personal.
2 Section 22(d), 54 Stat. 823 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80(a)-22(d) (1964) provides:
No registered investment company shall sell any redeemable security issued
by it to any person except either to or through a principal underwriter for
distribution or at a current public offering price described in the prospectus,
and, if such class of security is being currently offered to the public by or
through an underwriter, no principal underwriter of such security and no dealer
shall sell any such security to any person except a dealer, a principal under-
writer or the issuer, except at a current public offering price described in
the prospectus: Provided, however, That nothing in this subsection shall pre-
vent a sale made (i) pursuant to an offer of exchange permitted by section
80a-1l of this title including any offer made pursuant to clause (1) or (2)
of section 80a-11(b) of this title; (ii) pursuant to an offer made solely
to all registered holders of the securities, or of a particular class or series of
securities issued by the company proportionate to their holdings or propor-
tionate to any cash distribution made to them by the company (subject to
appropriate qualifications designed solely to avoid issuance of fractional
securities) ; or (iii) in accordance with rules and regulations of the Com-
mission made pursuant to subsection (b) of section 80a-12 of this title.
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The SEC's position on fund sales charges is based largely on two
facts: first, such charges as a per cent of sales price or net asset value
are generally much higher than on exchange transactions, and higher
on the average than charges on over-the-counter and new issue trans-
actions, with the differentials, in the Commission's view, not justified
by differences in the types of transactions involved.' The industry
has taken exception to the Commission's comparison of fund sales
charges with exchange commissions on the ground that the two types
of transactions are not comparable; when you buy a fund share, you
are really buying a diversified group of securities, and if you bought
this diversified group in small lots, which is typically what mutual
fund investors purchase, you would be paying rather substantial ex-
change fees. The Commission's answer, presumably-though it isn't
spelled out in the report-is that it isn't fair to compare the cost of
buying a large number of securities in small lots with the cost of
buying mutual fund shares, since the cost of purchasing stock is borne
by the investor through the fund and not by the selling organization.
Second, the Commission noted that sales charges have increased
markedly since the early 1950's, with the entire increase going into
higher dealer concessions. (Actually, there has been a decrease in
the average fund underwriting spread.) " The Commission concluded:
More than a quarter of a century of experience shows
that the sort of competition which in fact generally prevails,
i.e., competition among principal underwriters for the favor
of retail dealers rather than price competition among retail
dealers, has had the effect of raising rather than lowering
prices to the investor. . .. Most fund managers believe
that to achieve maximum sales of new shares they must make
the sales loads on such shares as attractive as they possibly
can-not to the investors who buy them but to the dealers
and salesmen who sell them.'
There is considerable merit in the SEC's position that competition
in this industry has not served its traditional function of reducing
the cost to the purchaser or (though the Commission does not make
this point explicitly) of improving services in the form of investment
performance for a given price-at least to the extent that this can be
ascertained from published studies.'
3 SEC Mutual Fund Report 209-15.
4 Typically the sales load is allocated between the principal underwriter and the
retailer. The Report stated that the principal underwriter usually retains from .5%
to 2.5% of the offering price and allots from 6 to 8% to the dealer. Id. at 207.
5Id. at 221.
6 Ibid.
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The weakness of ordinary competitive forces in the industry can
be further highlighted by reference to the availability of similar invest-
ment media offering comparable portfolio performance and diversifica-
tion but at a much lower price-that is, the no-load mutual fund or
the closed-end company selling at a sizable discount from asset value.
It is clearly the higher priced product which has had the growth,
reflecting the selling pressures associated with high sales charges.
The Economic Benefits of a High Volume of Fund Share Sales
There is, however, another side to this coin upon which the SEC
does not touch. The intensive selling effort associated with the cur-
rent level of sales charges might be considered to have a significant
social utility so long as the rate of return on common stock (which
accounts for an overwhelming share of funds' portfolios) is substan-
tially in excess of the return on alternative forms of investment. Since
the latter part of the nineteenth century, the annual rate of return on
common stock has amounted to fully twice the average corporate bond
yields. Apparently only part of this differential can be explained by
the difference between the ex-post or realized and the ex-ante or
required rate of return on the two types of securities. The post-war
surge in stock market participation by mutual funds as well as other
institutional investors has bolstered stock prices and lowered the re-
quired rate of return on equity investment. This lowered rate of
return is related to the funneling into equities of money which other-
wise would have been channeled into fixed interest obligations, and
the willingness of institutions to accept a lower premium for uncer-
tainty in view of their ability to diversify.
To the extent that such institutional developments lower the risk
premium and thus lower the cost of capital to business, investment
demand and economic growth are stimulated (assuming that realized
investment is not completely determined by the supply of saving).
While there is reason to believe that institutional developments have
somewhat reduced the disparity between the required rates on stock
and bonds, the disparity still seems to be substantial.
Any such reduction of the extremly large risk differential between
the yields on equity and on bonds has potentially favorable implica-
tions not only for the total amount of investment, but also for the
optimal allocation of investment funds, in that it no longer may be
necessary for business to pay a much higher premium for risk invest-
ment, which is typically financed by equity, than for less risky invest-
ment which is ordinarily financed by some combination of bonds and
equity. While this premium may be fully warranted from the view-
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point of individual investors in the absence of a substantial mutual
fund industry or similar institutions, the social cost may be
considerable.
Moreover, the apparent economic advantages of a burgeoning
mutual fund industry do not seem, as yet, to have been associated
with significant hardships to a substantial fraction of mutual fund
investors apart from those investing in contractual or front-end load
plans. As a whole, such investors-and I am speaking about investors
in non-contractual plans-fared well in comparison with the per-
formance they would have had in the alternatives realistically open
to them.
It is true, of course, that, if possible, it would be desirable both
from the viewpoint of the investor and of the economy to have the
growth of the mutual fund industry (or similar alternatives) involve
less selling costs. This requires more effective price competition
which might be achieved through one of three approaches, only two
of which could be implemented by legislation or regulatory action.
Alternative: Revise Section 22(d)
The first, which is discussed briefly in the SEC report,7 is to
remove the retail price maintenance provisions of Section 22(d) of
the Investment Company Act, permitting retail dealers to attract
customers by offering lower prices. The SEC gives a number of
reasons for recommending a maximum sales load in preference to
amendment of 22(d), but apparently the most cogent argument in
the Commission's view relates to
• . . the unsettling and unforeseeable effects which abolition
of retail price maintenance might have on the broker-dealer
community .... 8
It can, however, be argued that freeing competitive forces by revising
section 22(d) might be preferable to government price-fixing, and
that the net result of such competition would be that a much higher
proportion of fund business would flow to the more efficient and
lower-cost members of the financial community.
Alternative: Improve Disclosure to Potential Tnvestors
A second approach to more effective price competition in the
setting of sales charges, one which is not considered in the SEC report,
is to provide potential investors with "full disclosure" so that they
are aware of the performance and costs of the funds offered to them
7 Id. at 218-23.
8 Id. at 223.
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compared with the broad alternatives which include other load funds,
no-load funds and closed-end investment companies-the latter fre-
quently selling at a discount. This is, at least in theory, more attrac-
tive than a maximum sales load and may be less disruptive than a
revision of 22 (d). The implementation of this approach might involve
the front page of the prospectus presenting information in a manner
prescribed by the SEC comparing the performance and cost of the
fund, over as long a period as feasible, with the corresponding averages
of other load funds, no-load funds, closed-end companies, and over-all
market performance weighted by the portfolio composition of the
fund in question. Costs would, of course, have to be related to size
of transactions.
Either of these two approaches appears to have significant advan-
tages over the setting of a maximum sales load. However, both pose
a number of problems, and there may well be other alternatives which
would be preferable. It seems to me that the SEC has demonstrated
the absence of effective price competition in the selling of mutual funds,
arising basically from the inability of fund investors to appraise the
product they are buying. The indicated solution to this problem is
less clear, and it may be that the mutual fund industry will have some
useful proposals toward this end.
Alternative: Encourage New Competition
While a concentrated effort to achieve fuller disclosure seems
to me to be the most appealing alternative, at least initially, for im-
mediate regulatory action, there is still a third way of achieving the
Commission's objective-the entry of new competition into the mutual
fund field. Large brokerage concerns and other large financial institu-
tions not now in the business might very well be in a position to sell
fund shares aggressively and profitably at a significantly lower cost
than the current sales charges. However, while this possibility might
be stimulated by the SEC report, it clearly is outside the Commis-
sion's purview.
RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Irwin, you raise the question of com-
petition. An obvious competitor on the size of the sales load within
the mutual fund industry is the no-load fund. However, no-load funds
have not been very successful in selling shares compared with the load
funds. Do any of you have ideas as to how the no-load story can be
more effectively presented to the public? Are these funds--or indeed
[Vo1.115:769
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all funds-unduly restricted by present SEC rules or regulations with
respect to advertising?
Advertising Restrictions Should Not Apply to Mutual Funds
MR. Go ON D. HENDERSON: I have long felt that the advertising
restrictions on mutual fund shares are too stringent, and I was disap-
pointed that the report did not deal with that question.
It seems to me that the present rules overlook a very fundamental
difference between a mutual fund share and other kinds of securities.
In a real sense, the mutual fund share is not so much a security as it
is a service. In other words, what's really being purchased when an
individual buys a mutual fund share is an investment management
service. He is not buying a security in the same sense as when he
buys General Motors and American Telephone.
The advertising restrictions that exist in the securities business
today were developed to prevent too much pre-selling of the market
when someone floats a new issue of bonds or a new issue of stock.
The purpose is to prevent creation of an erroneously high price for
the issue by pre-selling through overly bullish advertising.
This problem doesn't exist in the mutual fund business, because
the advertising that is put out is not going to affect the price of the
mutual fund share. So I think we are dealing with a different
conceptual situation.
And yet when we look at the way funds have to be advertised-
I guess the most dramatic example, Bob Loeffler, would be your com-
pany's ads-where on one page of Life Magazine we find an adver-
tisement for IDS insurance, with a picture of a happy family and the
usual kind of advertising presentation; and, on the next page, an
advertisement for the IDS fund which fits the "tombstone" require-
ment, has no pictures, and generally, is uninteresting.
MR. ROBERT M. LOEFFLER: The Advertising Department always
complains to me about that very fact.
MR. HENDERSON: If you were selling not a mutual fund share
but an investment management package, like a Value Line book, the
rules wouldn't be quite as tight; and I think the distinction is not
entirely logical.
I think that it might be more helpful in the sales end to improve
the freedom of advertising in the fund business, rather than dealing
with the sales load problem in the way the Commission suggests.
For example, what would be wrong, if you want to encourage
competition between, say, no-load funds and load funds-and, indeed,
between load funds, at the retail level-with an advertisement, that
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shows a happy family and points out the competitive advantages of
the particular fund?
I know it wouldn't fit-I guess--current policy, but what's really
wrong with that?
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I'll let either Phil or Dick answer that,
if they wish.
A Commission Staff Viewpoint
MR. RIcHARD M. PHILLIPS: Well, first of all, I think you all
ought to know that the SEC is not against happy families.
The question of advertising for mutual funds is a matter that
in recent years has received a good deal of consideration by the Com-
mission, with a resulting liberalization of the rules.
I would disagree with Gordon, however, on his premise that
there is no comparability, or very little comparability, between an
investment in a mutual fund and an investment in other types of
securities. In a mutual fund you are buying investment management.
You are committing your capital to the management of others. When
you invest money in a specific security, you are also buying manage-
ment to a large extent. There are other factors that differentiate
between an investment in a specific security and in a mutual fund,
but in both there is a complex decision to be made, and it is a decision
that very often can't be made on the basis of the limited information
that necessarily goes into an advertisement.
Now, to the extent that there is a justification for more liberal
advertising rules in the mutual fund field, it stems from the fact that
the mutual fund purchaser, as a matter of practice, gets a prospectus
before he buys the security. Prospectuses in connection with conven-
tional distributions of securities are not required to be, and frequently
aren't, delivered until there is a confirmation of the sale. This
difference has been recognized by the Commission, particularly in
recent years, and I think the door to the Commission for discussions
of further proposals on advertising is always open, and adjustments
in existing restrictions can be made.
On the happy family question I prefer not to express an opinion,
because I don't know whether the Commission has ever passed upon
it, and what I would do with the happy family picture might be pure
"heresy" to the five men who sit at the Commission table.
I think there is room for further discussion and further liberaliza-
tion of the advertising rules; it is an area that cannot be left without
policing. Advertising has as much potential for false and misleading
[Vo1.115:769
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impressions as any other form of selling technique. I'm sure we all
realize that.
MR. PHILIP A. LooMIs, JR.: May I add just a little?
This isn't wholly a matter of Commission policy. This restriction
arises under the Securities Act, where the Commission doesn't have
any general power to grant exemptions, as it does under the Invest-
ment Company Act. While I can understand Gordon's economic
argument, the fact is that, legally, a mutual fund share is a security,
and to say that it can be sold by means of advertising, while no other
securities can, under a statute which draws no such distinction, is
not too easy.
There possibly could be special legislation for the mutual funds
in this area, exempting or easing their restrictions. I think some case
could be made for it. On the other hand, this would open up the whole
question that was decided by Congress in 1933 and reaffirmed in 1954
-securities should be sold by supervised disclosure in a prospectus
and by oral solicitations, but not by unsupervised advertisements.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I suppose some people might argue that
it's easier to supervise written advertisements than oral solicitation.
MR. LooMIS: I might add that Congress recognized that, and
the reason we don't supervise oral solicitations, except perhaps in a
proceeding after the fact, is that it's just impossible.
Impact of Liberalized Advertising Rules on Sales Cost
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I'd like to ask some of you who sell
fund shares whether or not expanded advertising rules would really
help your sales effort? If you could have expanded advertising, could
you get your story across to the public more cheaply, and therefore
be able to make your sales at a lower over-all cost?
MR. RAYMOND GRANT: I don't think so, because we have found
that the mutual fund, being the complex investment medium that
it is, has to be sold by salesmen. As a matter of fact, our position
is quite comparable to the life insurance industry. Although that in-
dustry has many more billions of dollars in assets than we have, and a
much more sacred image in American financial planning, it still finds
it necessary to send an army of salesmen out to sell policies in people's
homes, around the kitchen table with both husband and wife present.
MR. HERBERT R. ANDERSON: I was interested to hear the first
man from the industry speak that way. I feel, frankly, that the
happy family ad probably should not be allowed.
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I would like to make one other observation which is quite obvious
to those of us in the business, but not always to others. The other
financial institutions-insurance companies, savings and loan institu-
tions, banks-use the shareholders' money to run their advertising.
They have quite large budgets. In the case of the investment com-
pany, the essence of the structure is to protect the fund shareholder
from the entrepreneurial risks and costs of promotion, so the $40
billion of investment company managed assets is not a source for any
expenditures for advertising. It would have to come from the
sponsors, and they don't have $40 billion.
PROFESSOR MORGAN SHIPMAN: Bob, I agree almost completely
with the position that you and Gordon have always taken. There
should be a complete and basic rethinking of the advertising question.
At least some underwriters want to experiment with written advertise-
ments. In the sale of mutual fund shares, it appears that the prospec-
tus is in fact used and read before the security is sold; that provides
solid ground for liberalizing the mutual fund advertising rules. I'm
not nearly as concerned as Phil that this is so difficult to do under
the Securities Act. The American Depositary Receipts experience 9
MR. HENDERSON: If I can just make a comment, I know when we
were working on this that we found most people we talked to in
the business had Herb's reaction; namely, we don't have the money;
we couldn't put on a big advertising campaign; and we're doubtful as
to how much good it would do.
None the less, I think that consideration ought to be given to
liberalization of these rules. I think, for example, that it might be
useful if an ad came out from a group of no-load funds that advertised
that they were offering a mutual fund share without a load. This
would get their name in front of people who didn't even know there
was such a thing as a no-load fund; or if they knew there was such a
thing, who didn't know how to go about finding out the names of
the funds and where to write. If an ad was attractive and simple
and gave the names of a series of no-load fund sponsors and an in-
dication of where you could write for information, this might be all
to the good, assuming that adequate controls were put on it. You
might find that the closed-end funds would engage in some ad-
vertising and you might get some interesting and imaginative counter-
advertising from the load funds.
One of the problems of this business has been in getting people
to understand what a mutual fund share is. While salesmen are
9 See 1 Loss, SEcurrizs REGULATi N 463-65 (1961).
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needed, a little bit of good pre-selling with interesting advertising
would be very helpful.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: This approach also gets at the public's
lack of awareness of alternatives, a problem emphasized in the Special
Study.j°
The Requirements of the Cashion Opinion
MR. LOEFFLER: We at IDS do, I suppose, substantially more
advertising-or have in the last few years-than is common in our
industry, although it's still much less than any other type of sales
organization.
First, I would like to comment on the Cashion opinion," on
which maybe I'd better elaborate a little bit because I have had the
experience of trying to explain the Cashion opinion to the Director
of Advertising at IDS on innumerable occasions, and have never
succeeded in making myself clear. Ill make another effort at it here.
The Cashion opinion, in effect, says that if a dealer distributes any
number of securities, so that he has no specific security in mind-
theoretically-when he advertises, he is permitted to make a general
advertisement about mutual funds. He is not then restricted by the
tombstone requirement, which in effect requires that all you can say
in an ad is: we've got something if you want to inquire about it, and
then maybe we'll tell you what it is.
The Cashion opinion requires that if you have a specific security in
mind, or if you are a distributor only of certain specified securities (such
as IDS which distributes only the securities of IDS-managed funds and
other securities sponsored by IDS), then you cannot use any advertise-
ment that does not conform to the tombstone ad requirement, and
for example, cannot use a general advertisement that contains any
general description of what mutual fund securities are.
I would like to say, just for the record, that we do not agree
necessarily with the validity of the Cashion opinion, but that will
get us nowhere. We still have to conform to it and the IDS advertise-
ments with respect to securities must conform to the tombstone
requirements.
Market Tests of Advertising
You raised the question of whether a liberalization of advertising
perhaps would sufficiently aid the sales effort and enable a reduction in
10 Securities & Exchange Comnm'n, Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 4, ch. XI, 144 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SEC Special Study of Markets].
11 National Association of Securities Dealers, What Yott Must Know . . . ?
37-39 (1961).
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the costs now necessary for the distribution system as it exists, and
thereby provide for a reduction in sales cost. I can only say that
I don't know. I don't believe there is any way of knowing, because
we have never had an opportunity to market-test, using advertisements
designed under a more liberal rule.
Today, we are conducting at IDS a market test on the present
form of advertisement to see whether it's worth a plug nickel. We
do not have the results of these market tests, but I don't think that
anybody feels that the kind of advertising done today is very effective.
It may help the morale of the sales representatives, because at least
they feel they are getting some kind of support. But I don't think
that anybody feels you ever sell a mutual fund share with the kind
of advertising permitted today, and I don't think there is any way
of knowing if different advertising would aid in the sales effort with-
out an opportunity to try it.
Financing Fund Advertising
PROFESSOR MUND IEIM: If there is a liberalization of the rules
governing advertising and an increase in the amount of advertising,
from what source will it be financed?
MR. HENDERSON: I can't speak for the SEC, but the 1940 Act,
of course, provides that a no-load fund can only incur a sales expense
through the route of the management fee; 12 the manager has to pay
for promotion. The fund cannot do so.
I'm anticipating our future discussion a bit, but it seems to me
that one of the results of the Commission's recommendations in the
three areas of management fees, sales load and reciprocal business-a
of which will reduce the money available for sales promotion-will be
to increase pressure on managements of load funds to put the cost of
sales on the fund.
For example, I suspect the question will be asked: what's wrong
with having the fund pay the expenses presently absorbed by the
principal underwriter, so that it can pass on to the retailer the entire
5 per cent sales load which the Commission says it will permit? I'm
quite certain that if I were a director of a mutual fund, and sales
began to nose down after adoption of the Commission's recommenda-
tions, I would have to start thinking about that.
There is limited precedent for this in the way the no-load fund
pays for sales out of the management fee. There is also some precedent
in the load fund area. There have been cases where fees have been
32 Investment Company Act § 10(d) (5), 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-
10(d) (5) (1964).
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paid directly by funds to their principal underwriter or even to
retail dealers. But, by and large we have had a sort of divided world;
the no-load funds have paid for promotion out of management fees,
whereas the rest of the funds haven't imposed sales-type expenses
directly on the fund shareholders themselves.
If the SEC recommendations in these areas become law, I think
we are going to face a lot of questions and problems in that area.
Something will have to give.
MR. ANDERSON: The assumption that the no-loads pay for their
advertising out of the management fee, because that's the only source
of income, is, in my humble opinion, totally unrealistic. The people
who organize no-load funds are not philanthropists. They have a
business. Typically, they are either in the brokerage business or they
are in the money management business, and they decide as businessmen
that it would be a good idea to offer a no-load fund, and they
advertise it.
Certainly, the day they organize their fund they have no manage-
ment fee. The average expenditure for advertising by a no-load fund
is greatly in excess of the average on the part of the load funds. I
think of one no-load fund that ran at one point a series of ten or
twelve full-page ads in the Sunday Times Magazine section, and that
isn't cheap. And when I sent over for the literature that was adver-
tised, I found that it was a packet which, I would guess, cost between
$1 and $2 each, far in excess of what we could do.
As far as a load fund is concerned, it is selling its manage-
ment, and if the management fee is a reasonable one, in my humble
opinion, the businessman has a perfect right to make a profit, and he
has a perfect right to spend his money, from whatever honorable
source it is earned, for advertising if he pleases.
PROFESSOR MUNDIIEIM: I'm not surprised to hear that no-load
funds spend a great deal more on advertising than load funds. How
else are they supposed to sell their funds? The question is whether
the source of financing of such advertising is proper. Gordon
seems to think that fund assets themselves are a possible and appro-
priate source for such financing.
TH[E FIVE PER CENT SALES LOAD LIMIT AND THaE RETAILER
Perhaps we should now take a look at the 5 per cent (or 4.6
per cent) sales load from the point of view of the retailer. Can the
retail organization exist under such a reduced scheme of compensation?
Ray, I think you ought to get the first crack at that.
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MR. GRANT: Preliminarily, I would like to say that the Com-
mission in its report had some complimentary things to say about
mutual funds. They found that by offering the American public
professionally managed investments, the mutual funds fulfill an im-
portant public need; that the industry has earned its place as an
important member of our nation's financial community; and that, on
the whole, mutual funds are diligently managed by competent people.
They may have said these things before, but I haven't seen them
in print, and on this occasion I would wonder, perhaps, whether they
could not have devoted more than three sentences in a 350-page
report to this kind of statement.
PROFESSOR MUNDIHEIM: You wanted them to do a little advertis-
ing for you.
MR. GRANT: In any case, the Commission likes mutual funds,
and this morning we are going to discuss their recommendations with
respect to something they like. Later this afternoon we will discuss
their recommendations with respect to something they don't like. It
seems that they both come out the same.
Chairman Cohen, in his letter of transmittal, made the following
statement, which essentially repeated a statement previously made in
the Special Study:
The report, of course, makes no attempt to assess the
merits of investment company securities relative to other
media of investment.13
The Unique Quality of the Fund as an Investment Medium
This morning we heard Dick Phillips state that in his mind
mutual funds were not essentially different from other securities. I
think that this is the basic defect in the Commission's report. Al-
though the Commission's report does draw some distinctions, -ulti-
mately it places mutual funds on the shelf of a broker-dealer, side by
side with listed securities, over-the-counter securities and uranium
stocks-the theory being that a customer will walk in and take
his pick.
It doesn't work that way. As a matter of fact, mutual funds
are so unique an investment that they virtually comprise a separate
investment medium. They are bought differently and they are sold
differently. They are, by definition, a long-term investment, to be
disposed of only when the investor has finally reached his investment
goal, to be substituted for only when his investment objective has
changed.
Is SEC Mutual Fund Report viii.
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On the base of a diversified, redeemable, professionally managed
investment has been built a package of services that have no counter-
part in the securities business or in any other investment medium.
Services such as dividend and capital gain reinvestment in full
and fractional shares of the fund, accumulation plans of all types, with-
drawal plans, letters of intent, cumulative discounts, lifetime volume
discounts, exchange privileges in family fund complexes, highly
mechanized custodial arrangements and bookkeeping facilities-all
built in, all developed accumulatively over the years-have tended to
make the product better, finer and more economical.
This is the reason, perhaps, why $40 billion has been invested
by Americans at all economic levels, at every level of sophistication
and every level of experience, in this investment medium-which now
comprises the fastest-growing investment medium in the United States,
if not the world.
Funds Must Be Sold
The question comes up as to why with all of these marvelous
attributes people just don't call up to buy mutual funds-and they
don't. Perhaps it's because mutual funds offer essentially a deferred
benefit, rather than present enjoyment. People buy individual secu-
rities with the hope of making, in many cases, a quick profit, but
basically they do not buy mutual funds and cannot be sold mutual
funds properly with that in mind-certainly not responsibly sold that
way, and not responsibly purchased that way.
Human nature being what it is, people tend to buy things from
which they get immediate enjoyment. If left to themselves, they'll
buy their cars and clothing today, and defer those purchases which
offer them deferred benefits. It's the nature of things. It's perhaps
the reason why other agencies of the government, recognizing this,
have planned Social Security on a mandatory basis. Left to their
own resources, most people probably would not plan Social Security
for themselves.
It is for this reason, as I stated before, that life insurance, which
also offers a deferred benefit, has to be sold-has to be explained to
people. You can't expect them to go out and buy it themselves. And
if it is a useful product-if it does serve a public need-then it's the
kind of a product that should be encouraged rather than discouraged
in the American financial community.
Another reason, perhaps, is that mutual funds, being part of a
continuous offering, don't lend themselves to the sense of urgency
that an underwriting might; getting in quickly at the right price is
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relatively immaterial in mutual fund investing. The fact that they have
to be sold is apparent-and the load, or the fact that there may be no
load, isn't terribly significant, as evidenced by the fact that the no-load
funds represent no more than 5 per cent of the total assets of our
industry. It's also significant that savings bank life insurance, which
is sold without sales charge and which is probably as cheap a life
insurance medium as you can find, also represents only a very small
fraction of the total life insurance in force in the United States.
People just do not, as a matter of fact, plan for next year or the
year after-they need help. They need some motivation; and it takes
salesmen, in most cases, to motivate people to do this.
The Compensation of the Retailer
If we need selling, and we need salesmen, then we come to the
question of compensation. The report tells us-and it's true--that
typically the sales charge is 82 per cent under current conditions; that
of the 82 per cent the principal underwriter typically retains 2
per cent '4 -and to my knowledge no one has ever accused the prin-
cipal underwriter, with the expenses that are incurred by him, of
making any profit, or any inordinate profit in this business.
Six-and-one-half per cent, then, is typically retained by the
dealer. If he is a one-man dealer, and he works hard, he can make
a decent living. He won't get rich. However, if he's a typical dealer
who maintains certain facilities and has salesmen working for him,
he typically pays out about 4 per cent to the salesmen. From the 22
per cent that he retains he has to pay his rent, his telephone, his
secretarial, bookkeeping and record-keeping expenses. In recent years
there has been much more emphasis on proper-and often expensive-
supervisory and training facilities. All of these are expensive, and all
of these are paid from the 22 per cent that the retailer retains from
the sales that are made by his men.
The salesman, if he is full time, if he can afford to be full time,
if he treats his job as a forty-hour per week job, if he is well-
organized, and if he's well-supervised, will have to make approxi-
mately ten calls before he can generate three appointments, from which
he can make one sale. That's our experience for a good man who
is working hard and has his time well organized.
He will make, if he works hard, three sales a week, and he will
have to see some people two or three times before he can sell them.
I think that the Commission's report states that the typical sale
is something like $1250, or $1240.' I think the typical share sale
14 Id. at 207.
Ir Id. at 206-07.
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is something higher-closer to $2,000. If he makes three sales per
week of $2,000 each, he will gross $240. If he is unfortunate enough
to have one of his sales as a $50 per month voluntary program and
he receives two payments down on such program, he will have received
$4 for that night's work. However, he will make some sales that are
more than $2,000, and if he makes any really good sales, he will be
making them at a discount from his regular commission.
In any case, we would guess that a full-time man, working under
the circumstances I described, will gross somewhere between $12,000
and $13,000 a year. He will pay all of his own expenses, his own
outside telephone, his own travel, his own dinners in those evenings
when he is working, pay for his own automobile and gas, and enter-
tainment to the extent that he entertains. If he is just doing a cash
business and a voluntary plan business, he might net out, if he is
careful, $10,000.
He's always seeking new customers, because many of his cus-
tomers will only buy once. He's not dealing with the kind of security
that is traded. Mutual funds are bought for keeping, and many times
he will never be able to make another sale to the same customer.
Accordingly, he will find himself over the years with 400, 500 or
600 customers on his list.
We have been asked to professionalize our salesmen, to be more
careful about our recruiting, to be more careful about our training and
certainly to be more careful about our supervising of salesmen. We
have a problem, under current standards, of finding the right people,
who are prepared to give up what they are doing now in order to
make this kind of a living by selling mutual funds in the responsible
manner which is expected of them in our industry.
What has been suggested is that roughly a 44 or 45 per cent
reduction in sales charge be put into effect, on the theory, perhaps,
that we are getting too fat, or that there is some fat that can somehow
be redistributed, or that it's unnecessary for us to remain in business
and make a profit.
We are in one of the most competitive businesses in America,
despite what I have heard and what I have read. We find that we are
competing for people's extra dollars. People first pay their rent, and
then buy their cars and everything else that they would like to have
currently.
In addition to the competition for the dollar, which is the extra
dollar, we have a great deal of competition within the industry among
dealers and among funds; and if we thought for a moment that we
16 Wharton Report 109-11.
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could reduce the sales charge and double our sales by doing so and
still make a profit, as businessmen, you can be sure we would have
done this long ago.
What has happened, actually, is that competition has taken on a
unique aspect. It has served to improve the product, if it has not
served to reduce the sales charge. The product, as we know, has
been improved in each and every year. The withdrawal plan, one
of our most recent innovations, is an example of the improvement
of our product.
My point is that if the Commission has made any economic study
of our business, it remains unpublished; at least I haven't seen it. It
appears to be an arbitrary selection of 5 per cent, related to, perhaps,
other factors in the securities business, to which mutual funds, to my
mind, have no relation; an arbitrary-almost a capricious suggestion-
that the charges be reduced, without an economic study that would
justify the continuance of responsible brokers and dealers in this
business, and responsible sales people who have to bring the mutual
fund message to the public.
Quite frankly, if the Commission's legislative recommendations
are put into law, I look forward to a mass migration of good people
from our business to areas where, with the same type of training, the
same type of approach to the public, they can make more money or
just make a decent living. That's all we're suggesting. That's all the
record shows anybody ever makes from selling mutual funds. Nobody
has gotten rich selling them. A good living can be made if you work
hard, but that's all.
It's almost, to my mind, as severe a recommendation as if the
Commission had recommended that we be legislated out of business.
What they haven't recommended directly, they have surely recom-
mended indirectly.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: The audience seems to have found your
comments very congenial.
MR. GRANT: Thank you.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I wonder whether everybody on the
panel, though, would agree with everything that you have said.
A Sympathetic View of the Five Per Cent Recommendation
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: Well, Bob, I disagree in several respects.
I'm not sure that I have as many supporters in the audience, but I
shall proceed.
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First, I'm upset when we hear words like "capricious" being used
concerning the Commission's report. In discussing these very hard
problems, language like that will not enable or aid anyone-especially
Congress-to fashion sensible solutions.
The Commission approaches the problem differently than Ray
does. The Commission does not point to excess profits in the sale
of mutual fund shares. I have not seen any figures showing that the
salesmen are overcompensated or that the underwriters are neces-
sarily making excessive profits. Rather, the focus of the Commission
has been a comparison between sales charges on exchange-listed secu-
rities and on mutual fund shares; and they aren't that different. I
think that the diversified closed-end investment company listed on the
New York Stock Exchange would be startled to learn that the mission
and function of it and the mutual fund differ fundamentally. Both
provide diversification. The no-load funds also provide diversification
and professional management, paid for by the advisory fee. The sales
load is paid solely for sales effort.
The Commission, looking at the disparity, is saying-and this is
conventional in securities regulation-that the load or commission can
become so high that it's unreasonable-almost grossly unreasonable-
to charge an investor this much in a particular transaction.
On management fees and sales loads, the Commission chose to
recommend extremely conservative solutions-solutions much more
favored by the industry. Paradoxically, in each area, the Commission-
recommended solution is harder to defend, in terms of pure symmetrical
logic, than alternatives requiring basic changes in industry structure.
In the management fee area we see a suppression-a partial sup-
pression-of arm's length bargaining. The most straightforward, but
most radical, thing to do would be to change the structure of the
industry by saying: all funds internalize. We would have no conflict
of interest. This would be a simple piece of legislation, and con-
ceptually it would be quite neat. However, I don't think the industry
wants that. The Commission adopted the far, far more conservative
view that internalization should not be recommended at this time and
that the Commission should not regulate management fees, but that in
court they be subject to a test of reasonableness.
Turning to sales loads, again the Commission, by choosing a
more conservative and industry-favored recommendation, took the
hardest path-although I think the Commission is acting very re-
sponsibly on both management fees and sales loads. On sales loads,
there is no competition in the usual sense. We have the only man-
datory federal fair trade law on the books, section 22(d), which
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makes it a positive violation of the act for any dealer to deviate from
the sales loads that have been set.
I have great sympathy with what Dr. Friend said; I'm close to
the line on this. And it would be much easier for the Commission
to say: let's repeal section 22(d). Let's see what competition does,
and let's stay out of it.
However, everyone knows that one of the major presentations
made by the industry to the Commission during the period in which the
report was prepared was a plea for the preservation of section 22(d).
The Commission feels that the industry can't have it both ways. They
can't suppress competition with section 22(d) and then set their own
levels of sales loads. The Commission found the acquisition cost of
listed securities-for example, shares of a diversified closed-end
investment company-to provide a useful comparison. I think that
on some of the very small transactions, 5 per cent is too little.
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A DECREASED SALES LOAD
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Irwin, can I get a reaction from you
on (1) whether or not the attempt to compare mutual fund sales loads
with, for example, underwriting spreads or the New York Stock
Exchange commission rates is a proper method of comparison? (2) if
the sales load is cut down almost by a half, what impact on the flow
of money into fund shares can one predict?
DR. FRIEND: Well, can I answer those two specific questions
initially, and then address myself to the general point that you made?
First of all, my own feeling is that the correct price for any commodity
or service is a competitive price, and I think it's perfectly dear that
most economists-99.99 per cent of economists-would not consider
the current pricing policy of the industry as competitive, even though
they would consider it quite rational. I'll get back to this point.
Now, the second question. The Wharton School Study showed
that there was a very strong positive correlation between sales charge
and growth of funds-i.e., the net flow of money into the fund-
much stronger, incidentally, than the correlation between performance
of the fund and the sales charge. 1
This indicates, I think pretty clearly, that with a drop in the
average sales load to 5 per cent or something below that, depending
on the base you use, you would have, at least initially, a rather sub-
stantial decrease in the flow of money into the mutual funds, unless




financial organization entering the mutual fund business; but my best
judgment would be that there would be a substantial decrease in the
flow of money into mutual funds.
However, I would like to go on to something a little broader.
I'd like to attempt to summarize very briefly what I understand to be
the Commission and the industry view, as just expressed.
Investor Ignorance of Alternatives
The Commission is essentially taking the position that sales of
mutual fund shares are not operating under competitive conditions.
They say, on what I would consider to be pretty incontrovertible evi-
dence, that people just don't realize the alternatives open to them.
I have heard no one answer this argument.
The fact is that you do have closed-end funds selling at very
substantial discounts from net asset value. These are presumably
better buys than even the no-load funds. You do have no-load funds,
and there have been a number of performance studies indicating that
there is no difference between the average performance of no-load and
load funds, and between the average performance of a closed-end com-
pany and a mutual fund.
The second basic justification for the Commission's position, ap-
parently, is that there has been a trend to do whatever is required to
sell mutual funds-whatever is required, under legal restrictions, of
course-and the question they raise, which I think is a perfectly valid
one, is: where does this end?
One could argue that there are certain economic constraints, but
on the other hand you probably could sell more mutual funds, if you
paid the salesmen a lot more money. There is a limit, but no one
knows where that is.
Benefits of a High Volume of Sales
Now, the more thoughtful industry answer, apparently, is (or
should be) -I gather it probably is-that mutual funds represent a use-
ful commodity, a proposition about which there seems to be little
question. Mutual funds have to be sold. So long as the experience
that people have with such funds is favorable in relation to the alterna-
tives currently available to them, the current situation isn't bad.
There is some merit, I think, to this argument.
Commission Responsibility for the Cost of Sales
However, the Commission does take a further position which has
a considerable amount of justification: one of its responsibilities is
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to see that institutional arrangements are as good as they can be; not
merely to say that they can understand why certain institutional ar-
rangements exist, and as long as people are not getting hurt too badly,
what of it?
If a regulatory approach can give the economy what it is already
getting in terms of a healthy flow of money into the industry, and do
it at less social cost, less selling cost, I see no argument against it,
unless one feels that there is something socially desirable about giving
salesmen work or income; and I don't think anyone here is taking
this position.
Recapitulation of Alternatives to. Commission Recommendations
So the crucial question really is: can you have a healthy flow of
funds into the mutual fund industry, and still do something about this
clearly non-competitive sales charge?
I tried to suggest two alternatives, and one is the repeal of section
22(d). It is true that the industry has been operating under this
section for many years, and this alternative would change the rules
of the game. Moreover, it is possible that more than this may have
to be done.
I think it would be most sensible to go first via the route of
much more extensive disclosure. I think there is no question that
you can do much more in this area than is currently being done. I
agree that it's far from clear just how much you can do. I think the
suggestions made a little earlier about a more lenient attitude toward
advertising under effective SEC supervision are highly desirable. I
heard no arguments this morning against them. Some people don't
think it would work, but I see no harm in trying. Actually, I should
think the SEC would be all for it, since, as was pointed out by Phil
Loomis, it's much easier to supervise written advertising than oral
presentations.
Finally, I would be interested in knowing: what is the industry
attitude toward taking care of a clear deficiency in our system, namely,
that investors don't realize the alternatives open to them, thus prevent-
ing the operation of effective competition? Selling costs are much
higher than they would be under a truly competitive system. What
does the industry propose to do about it?
A STAFF EXPLANATION OF THE COMMISSION's RECOMENDATION
MR. PHILLIPS: I think there are a couple of notions that have
been articulated here which suggest things about the report that just
aren't so.
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Commission Recognizes That Funds Must Be Sold
One is the thought that the Commission in its report regards
mutual funds as just a shelf item, and that there is no need for any
selling effort. Nothing could be further from the truth. If that
were so, there would be no justification for a sales load that exceeds
an exchange commission rate. In fact, the Commission recommenda-
tion is for a maximum sales load that would amount to five times
the exchange commission rate and two-and-a-half times the round-trip
commission.
The Commission recognizes that the sale of mutual funds involves
selling effort. The question is: how much should the investor pay
for that selling effort?
Commission Doesn't Argue That Distributors Are Over-Compensated
Another thought that has been expressed is that perhaps the
Commission's recommendation is based on the theory that those who
sell mutual funds are getting "fat" on the sales load. That's not so.
There is no suggestion in the report that an excessive profit is made
in the selling end of the mutual fund industry. The fact is that the
type of competition that does prevail in this industry makes that an
impossibility.
The sales load is consumed by selling effort. The more sales
load, the more selling effort there will be. To a large extent, mutual
fund managers do not look upon underwriting as a source of profit.
Many managers of the largest mutual funds and fund complexes sub-
sidize their underwriting functions, and they do so deliberately, making
a business judgment: we want to sell as many shares as we can,
in order to earn management fees on it.
We don't quarrel with that business judgment, as long as the
subsidy does not come from fund shareholders in the form of un-
reasonable fees.
In the retail end of the business, entry is relatively easy. Mutual
fund dealers do not need large amounts of capital to finance inven-
tories. In fact, inventories of mutual fund shares are prohibited. The
principal operating expense is salesmen's commissions, which vary
in proportion to sales. The industry tries to get as many dealers
and as many salesmen as possible to sell fund shares. Hence the in-
dividuals in the industry who do the selling, because of competition
with other sellers, have a competitive limit on the amount of profit
they might make.
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Distinction Between Investment in Mutual Funds and Other Securities
The question is: how much should the investor pay for the selling
effort in mutual fund shares? To what extent does a mutual fund
investment differ from an investment in exchange traded securities, and
differ in a way that justifies a disparity in the selling compensation?
It has often been said that a mutual fund is a longer-term invest-
ment than investing in a particular security. We don't quarrel with
that statement, although there is no reliable information which shows
length of mutual fund holding periods, or any comparative data on
the length of holding periods with respect to other kinds of securities.
But the fact is that mutual fund shares can be a long-term invest-
ment only because the nature of the investment changes through port-
folio turnover. The average portfolio turnover rate of the funds is,
in fact, higher than the stock market average. Turnover costs
money, and it's the mutual fund shareholder who pays for it. This
type of expense has to be taken into consideration in evaluating the
reasonableness of the sales load.
It's this kind of approach to the problem that forms the basis of
the Commission's recommendation-not any misconception that people
are getting "fat" on sales loads or that salesmen don't work hard at
selling-but the question of fairness from the point of investors and
the justification for the disparity in cost between investing in exchange-
traded securities and mutual fund shares. It's on this basis that the
Commission reached its conclusion.
Evaluation of Proposal for Expanded Disclosure
Now, there have been a couple of suggestions made here as to
possible alternatives. One is comparative disclosure. That was dis-
cussed somewhat by the Commission as an alternative, and it seemed
pretty clear to most of us who would be engaged in the job of im-
plementing any comparative disclosure rules that, to a large extent,
it would be administratively unfeasible.
I question whether any prospectus that makes full and accurate
disclosure of the comparative costs of a mutual fund investment in a
particular fund with other alternatives, would be, as a practical matter,
readable to the person who is making the investment decision.
Evaluation of Proposal to Revise Section 22(d)
The alternative that did get extensive consideration by the Com-
mission was a modification of section 22(d) to permit retail price
competition. The Commission, in the course of its deliberations,
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sought out the views of a number of persons in the industry concern-
ing what the possible impact would be. These persons, who have a
feel for the practical aspects of mutual fund selling, thought that com-
petition would lower the sales load far below the 5 per cent limit.
I don't believe that the Commission was persuaded that this would
necessarily be so, but it was made very clear to the Commission that
to deal with the sales load problem via the competition route would
raise uncertainties as to what would happen to sales load levels in an
industry that has been living under the shelter of price protection for
more than twenty-five years.
The Justification for the Five Per Cent Recommendation
In that sense, the Commission viewed the statutory sales load
limitation route as being the most conservative way of dealing with
what it believed was a problem.
Now, I don't believe that the 5 per cent limitation can be
defended as the "correct price" by any kind of slide rule formula
derived from economic analysis, and I don't believe that the sales
load ought to be used, as Professor Friend seemed to suggest, as a
way of moderating or accelerating the capital inflow into the equity
markets. Securities regulation isn't designed for that purpose, al-
though there is no question that regulation does have an economic
impact.
Securities regulation ought to be molded from the point of view
of the protection of investors, and from this point of view a 5 per
cent sales load is a much fairer price to pay for the benefits conferred
by a mutual fund investment than the 82 per cent (or 9.3 per cent
of net asset value) sales load that's now charged.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Is it clear that the major standard by
which to measure your regulatory purpose is protection of investors?
Isn't the public interest another and possibly broader standard for
regulation? In that connection I am not clear why the Commission
chose to take so much in one bite-particularly when it is so difficult
to predict the impact of a substantially lower sales charge. Was any
consideration given to a more gradual approach? For example, lower
the sales load one per cent this year, study the effect, lower it another
per cent the year after and study the effect, and so on. Such an ap-
proach permits the Commission to call a halt if it appears that serious
and undesirable dislocations would occur.
MR. PHILLIPS: I think that the Commission would provide for
adjustments in terms of the impact in another way. Its proposal would
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provide for rule-making authority to raise rates, if the circumstances
indicated that would be in the public interest. Should-and I don't
believe there is any reason that it should-a 5 per cent sales load have
definite harmful effects on the securities markets, that authority could
be used to adjust it.
Economic Impact of the Commission's Recommendation
I don't believe that the Commission's recommendation will have
a far-reaching economic impact on the channeling of equity capital
to the markets. I don't question Professor Friend's suggestion that
there will be, initially, some drop in sales, but sales of mutual fund
shares, even in recent years, have fluctuated widely, particularly in
the last half of 1962 and 1963, and at the present time.
Although the period of time in which the funds have become an
important factor in the market is rather short, there seems to be a
pattern developing whereby mutual fund investors react to market
breaks, not through redemptions, but by curtailing their new purchases
of shares for a considerable period after a sharp market break such
as we had in 1962, and as we had more recently.
The securities markets, as well as the mutual fund industry, have
survived these kinds of fluctations in investment buying patterns, and
I think those who suggest that they can't survive a 5 per cent sales
load should read the legislative history of the other federal securities
laws, where speaker after speaker warned, and witness after witness
testified: if you pass this law, you will wreck the economy of this
country.
The federal securities laws so far have not wrecked the economy
of this country, and I don't believe that the Commission's recommenda-
tions, if enacted into law, will have any such effect.
IMPACT OF FIVE PER CENT RECOMMENDATION ON
LARGE NYSE FIRMS
PROFESSOR MUNDHEEIM: I must read one question from the
floor, which I think is very appropriate at this point.
As a sales manager of a very large, profitable member
firm of the New York Stock Exchange, I look forward to a
reduction in sales load to 5 per cent for several reasons:
1. Our fund business will grow and generate more
profits at the expense of small firms.
2. Many of Mr. Grant's salesmen will be delighted to




3. Small over-the-counter firms will disappear. Re-
gional operations will decrease, which means less competition
for our firm-[and more profits; he didn't say that].
I'm very happy that the direction of these proposals will
make us bigger, more profitable, more efficient.
MR. ANDERSON: What's the signature on that, Bob?
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Just "a large, already profitable stock
exchange firm."
Let me give Gordon the first crack at it.
MR. HENDERSON: I would say that your anonymous commentator
has really put his finger on it! What your commentator is really
saying is that the Commission's proposals will not only have an effect
on funds and their investors but on the entire structure of the broker-
dealer business, and that this effect will benefit the large NYSE mem-
ber firms and hurt the small firms and the non-NYSE firms. I tend
to agree. Let me explain why.
A reduction in the sales load would reduce the initial cost of
fund shares to investors. This is the Commission's goal. But this is
only the first and most obvious part of the story.
For, by the same token, the amount of money available for
stimulating and compensating the sales effort for fund shares will
be drastically reduced. This will occur not only because of the sharp
reduction in sales loads from 9.3 per cent to 5 per cent (or 8.5 per cent
to 4.8 per cent), but also because the Commission's recommendations
regarding management fee profits and portfolio brokerage commissions
would reduce the amount of management fees available to subsidize
the underwriting effort and the amount of brokerage commissions
available for sales purposes.
The Commission's recommendations regarding give-ups and
volume discounts would also affect the ease with which brokerage
commissions could be allocated to small NYSE member firms and to
nonmember firms. One effect of these proposals would be to make
it difficult if not impossible to get any meaningful brokerage com-
missions out to firms which are not capable of acting as primary
executing brokers. The small firm which today is providing only
research or sales effort for the fund brokerage commissions it re-
ceives, will find it quite difficult to keep this business if the Commis-
sion has its way. The result will be, I think, that fund brokerage
business and probably also fund sales business will concentrate in the
larger NYSE firms. The small firms and the nonmember firms will
be hurt. Thus, despite implied suggestions to the contrary in the
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report, I think one effect of the Commission's recommendations re-
garding sales loads and brokerage commissions will be to strengthen
the position of the New York Stock Exchange relative to the regional
exchanges and the Third Market, and the position of the larger NYSE
firms relative to all other firms. I think this is the point your
anonymous commentator is hinting at, and I agree.
Effect on Fund Share Sales
I think there are some other possible side effects. For example,
the effect of all this on sales of fund shares is unclear. Possibly the
lowering of cost to the investor may increase fund sales, or at least
neutralize the effect of any loss of promotional effort by salesmen (so
that overall sales may not be affected). However, past experience
would suggest it is perhaps more likely that fund sales will be reduced.
I would guess that most of us here would predict that this would be
the result.
If in fact fund sales are reduced, and if the reduction reaches
the point where funds begin to be threatened with the possibility that
redemptions may exceed sales, the result can be harmful to fund
shareholders. Portfolio management may become more difficult; it is
my understanding that management of a declining portfolio can be
more difficult than management of a growing one. And the per share
cost of management would probably increase as total assets decline.
There is another factor. To the extent these recommendations
reduce sales of fund shares, there may be a negative effect on general
levels of securities prices. Everybody seems in agreement that the
net inflow of money into mutual funds has tended to increase stock
prices. It would seem to follow that a reduction in this inflow would
work in the other direction.
I am a bit worried about a governmental policy which may
well have all these side-effects, unless the need for the policy is
terribly great.
Argument That the Level of Sales Load Is Not a Problem
How great is the need for the proposed reduction in the sales
load? Irwin Friend said he felt that the area of the basic sales load is
a problem area. Here I must confess-and I think this will not come
as a surprise to Phil Loomis or Dick Phillips, who know something
of the views I have had on this-that I do not agree. I am not really
very worried about the size of the basic sales load. A principal reason
why I am not worried is that the investor has a chance to buy a
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no-load fund, or a closed-end fund, rather than a load fund, if he so
desires. And I do not find the present basic load shockingly high.
I am also troubled by the reasons the Commission has advanced
for its proposal. For example, the report makes a finding that the
sales load is larger than standard stock exchange commissions, over-
the-counter commissions, or underwriting commissions, and then
reaches the value judgment that this is bad because it gives securities
salesmen an incentive to recommend fund shares to customers rather
than other securities, whereas we ought to promote so far as possible
neutrality instead of disparity in the incentives for investment recom-
mendations. But the Commission's recommendation would not elim-
inate disparity. There will still be differences between various over-
the-counter rates, exchange rates and underwriting rates. These dis-
parities cannot be eliminated. Indeed, it may even be that the
Commission's recommendation would increase rather than reduce the
actual economic disparity, by possibly making fund sales less profitable
than other sales. I think the report gives inadequate recognition to
the fact that, as Ray Grant mentioned, there tends to be less activity
in mutual fund shares than in other securities. The present stock
exchange commission may provide greater economic incentives (taking
into account excepted turnover) than the present mutual fund sales
load.
In addition, even if it is one's judgment that a real disparity in
favor of the funds does in fact exist today, one must recognize that
out of 20 million investors in the United States only 4 million own
fund shares -
Next, the Commission indicates it is troubled by the fact that
while the policy judgment reflected in the 1940 Act was to leave the
level of sales loads to be determined essentially by competition (so
long, I might add, as the level did not exceed 9 per cent), the effect of
competition has been to cause some increase rather than a decrease in
the overall amount of the average sales load (from roughly 7.5 per cent
to 8.5 per cent), and a marked increase in the proportion of the sales
load allocated to the retail dealer.1" Compared to increases in other
costs in our economy over this period, however, it seems to me that the
increase in the amount of the sales load is not very great. And the
tendency of competition to increase rather than decrease overall sales
loads and the proportion of them allocated to retail dealers was not
unanticipated by the framers of the 1940 Act. The Commission's
Investment Trust Study, which provided the foundation for the 1940
Act, specifically noted that the effect of competition among under-
1 8 INvEsTmNT COMPANY INsTrruTF, THE MUTUAL FUND SHAREoLDmER 3 (1966).
19 SEC Mutual Fund Report 208-09.
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writers for the favor of retail dealers had been to prevent the re-
duction of loading charges. °
So I have troubles with the reasons given for the Commission's
proposal to reduce the basic level of the sales load.
DIFFICULTIES IN JUSTIFYING A PARTICULAR SALES LOAD LIMITATION
But what really bothers me most is that the Commission gives
no reason for choosing its recommended 5 per cent figure. It is
presented as a purely arbitrary one. I think that when Dick Phillips
says he can't justify the proposed 5 per cent as being the absolutely
right figure, he has lost his case right there.
It is true that we live with somewhat arbitrary figures elsewhere.
For example, there is the NASD 5 per cent markup policy. But this
was not established in a completely arbitrary way. A study was
made of actual over-the-counter experience. The clustering of actual
markups was examined and the 5 per cent figure was established as
one which pretty much reflected what most people were doing.2,
Another example is the 9 per cent ceiling on contractual plan loads
set forth in the 1940 Act. While this specific ceiling was limited to
contractual plans, it has in fact provided a ceiling for all fund loads.
People have been unwilling to go above this figure for fear the
Commission would consider any higher amount to infringe the
statutory provision against basic sales loads that are "grossly ex-
cessive." ' I don't recall the precise statutory history on this, but
it is my recollection that the 9 per cent figure represented pretty much
the upper level of a clustering of actual basic sales loads, if not of
total contractual plan loads and charges.
What bothers me about use of a wholly arbitrary figure is that
it cannot be analyzed in terms of objective standards. How does one
write the brief for the Commission that says that 5 rather than 6
per cent is right; or for the fund that says that 6 rather than 5 per
cent is right? What are the standards to guide judgment? I can't
find the answer. When we discuss management fees, we can base
our determinations on comparisons with fees charged to other funds
or to pension funds or in other contexts. We can argue rationally
about what situations are comparable or not comparable, what adjust-
ments have to be made, and so forth. We can base our determinations
on objective grounds. But here admittedly we are dealing with a
figure that has not been determined, or at least has not been sup-
20 Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies,
H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., Pt. 3, 826-27 (1939).
21 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, MANuAL f 2154 (CCH
1967).




ported in the report, by reference to objective standards. If 5 per cent
is better than 9.3 per cent today, what is to prevent the Commission
from deciding tomorrow that 1 per cent is better than 5 per cent?
What standards are being applied?
I'm not worried just about the 5 per cent. I'm also worried
about the scale-down, because, as I read this report, it says that the
Commission wants to have rule-making power governing volume
discounts for basic fund sales loads.
Well, what's going to happen when the Commission tells a fund:
"You've got to have a volume discount." And the fund says: "What
kind? Where? How much?"
The Commission may reply: "Well, we guess maybe the scale
ought to be like this one." And it hands out a scale, and the fund
says: "Why this? Why do we have to cut down our load to 432 per
cent at $1,000, and 4 per cent at $2,000,"--or whatever the figure is
going to be-"Why?"
And if we can't get a reason for that, we are now in an area where
everything is utterly arbitrary, and I would find this very difficult to
live with. 11 (
The net result for me, therefore, is that I have trouble with the
Commission's proposal.
I would like to see some more effective promotion of no-load funds,
closed-end funds and load funds, if that's possible; I may be naive
in my feeling that better advertising will foster it, but I would rather
work in that area than get the Commission involved in making these
very arbitrary decisions where the results aren't defended by reference
to objective standards.
That's my problem.
PROFESSOR MUNDEEIM: I think we ought to give Dick or Phil
an opportunity to try to help Gordon solve his problem.
Justification for the Five Per Cent Maximum Sales Load
MR. PRaILIPs: Well, I think that Gordon, as an attorney, and
mutual fund underwriters and dealers, as businessmen, solve these
problems every day. When they decide to set a sales load at 8Y2
rather than 72 per cent, they have no mathematical formula that
tells them: this is "the correct" sales load. They reach a judgment,
and they reach it on the basis of as many facts as they can possibly
get. But essentially it's a judgment.
When Congress in 1940 established the 9 per cent sales load
limitation for contractual plans, and when the industry supported that
decision, there was no slide rule formula demonstrating that it was
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"the correct" limitation. That was a judgment, a judgment made
on the basis of facts before them, a judgment that was not necessarily
right, but one they believed was right. When they enacted it into law
they took a step forward in protecting investors from unreasonably
high sales loads.
The step we are suggesting here was arrived at by the same
method, and, I think, on the basis of more facts than has been suggested.
MR. LoomiS: Could I say something too?
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Yes, surely.
MR. LooMIs: In the first place, I don't agree with Gordon that
the 5 per cent figure is as unsupported as he suggests. It was based
on a comparison with the sales compensation prevailing elsewhere
in the securities markets, with a judgment that the sales load for
mutual funds should be higher than prevails elsewhere, substantially
higher, but not way, way out of line.
In the second place, I think that Gordon somewhat misinterprets
the question which Bob read. The man who asked it appeared to be
of the view that because he is with an efficient firm having a diversified
product line, he can operate profitably on the 5 per cent figure. In
fact, it won't hurt him at all-which, I think, tends to detract from
the argument that this will have a devastating over-all effect on the
level of mutual fund sales or on the public interest. That indicates
that this is a figure that an efficient firm is satisfied that it can live with.
The Special Study's report on mutual fund selling not only turned
up some practices which it regarded as contrary to the interests of
investors, but also showed that the operation was essentially ineffi-
cient.' The reduction in sales load will have an impact there. I am
not inclined to believe that this will have a major effect on the public
interest over all.
There is authority in the Commission to vary sales loads.
Gordon, I think, raises an imaginery spectre when he thinks that
the break points will come out of thin air. The industry has had
break points for years.
MR. HENDERSON: Would you say that they have been at points
which are effective?
MR. LoomIs: We do feel that in most instances, although not all
instances, they are too high, but we can do just what you said was
done in connection with the 5 per cent policy, and elsewhere: build
on the existing pattern and practice, cutting off what seemed to be
excrescences, just as was done when the 9 per cent limit was set.
23See generally SEC Special Study of Markets, Pt. 4, cl. XI, 102-39.
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And as Dick says, if we find that there is an impact, as some
suggest, on small dealers out in the country which is different from
that on the metropolitan dealers, the rules could take that into account
as well. But the basic object is to reduce the sales loads to a point
where they are more nearly compatible with the sales compensation
that prevails in other areas, while still recognizing that they must be
higher.
Impact of the Five Per Cent Maximum Sales Load on Non-NYSE
Firms
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I thought the question implied an addi-
tional point. The reason that this New York member firm was going
to be able to compete better with a 5 per cent sales load is that its
compensation package is higher net than that of most nonmember
firms. In other words, in addition to its share of the 5 per cent sales
load, it gets perhaps 3 per cent for reciprocal business, which Ray
Grant's firm perhaps doesn't get, and perhaps Bob Loeffler's sales
force doesn't get. When you look at the sales compensation picture,
don't you have to look at everything that goes to make up sales com-
pensation-sales load plus whatever money is in the reciprocal busi-
ness end of it?
Ray, isn't that why a reduction of the sales load to 5 per cent
would hurt you more than it might hurt somebody else?
MR. GRANT: Yes, and it isn't a question of being more or less
efficient in our operation than anybody else. It resolves itself down
to how many products we plan to sell.
If we are in the mutual fund business, and we stick to that busi-
ness, then we have to look to our compensation from the structure
of that business. What was suggested in that question, as I inter-
preted it, was not that the questioner's firm had a more efficient opera-
tion, but that he could then proselytize all of my salesmen to do
whatever other business he happened to be handling at the same time.
I can see our men drifting into life insurance and conglomerate
financial corporations, probably getting into all kinds of allied financial
intangible selling. That, I think, is the main thrust of that particular
letter.
I would like to make two comments while I have the microphone.
First of all, I think that Mr. Shipman and Dr. Friend made the point
that there are alternatives, and particularly Dr. Friend pointed out
that it was ignorance in some regard that kept people from electing
the other alternatives. I take issue with that.
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I don't think that it's a matter of ignorance. I think it's a matter
of, going back to my own argument, which the facts of life reveal to us,
that people just don't do things by themselves. They may know all
about no-load funds; they may know all about closed-end funds; and
they do nothing about them. My point is that they have no real
alternatives; that if they decide to get into the market with modest
amounts of money, the chances are more likely that they will buy
some low-priced over-the-counter security, and probably get killed
in the process; that these are the experiences that we have with people
of modest means, when they seek other alternatives.
The comparison that Mr. Shipman makes with closed-end funds,
I think, is altogether unrealistic. A closed-end fund is nothing more
to me than just another security. What is selling at a discount
today may very well be selling at a greater discount two years from
today. It's no different, in my opinion, than a well-diversified company
that has engaged in a series of acquisitions, so that it's in eighteen
different businesses, and it's just another security, subject to price
movements that depend to a large extent on public popularity. It is
in no way comparable to a long-term investment program in mutual
funds that, if properly sold and properly explained by salesmen, will
be continued by purchasers as an existing program possibly for the
duration of their lives, or until they reach the objective for which the
program was purchased.
INDUSTRY VIEWS ON THE SALES LOAD
MR. ANDERSON: It's a strange thing to me that the facts that are
available don't seem to be given any credit. I happen to have the actual
figures in the case of Distributors Group's sales of our fund, and the
average sales charge-the effective rate paid-declined 15 per cent
in the ten years from 1955-65.
If we throw in the amount of money that also was invested in the
fund through reinvested dividends, the decline is 20.6 per cent. If I
exclude the accumulation plan sales from these figures, the decline in
the ten-year period has been 21.3 per cent.
Now, I don't know whether this was competition or magnanimity
or good business judgment, because I'll also confess to you that at
these lower rates Distributors Group made more money, and I think
that's perfect.
Adequate Compensation at the Retail Level
On the need for adequate compensation for the retailer, look at
closed-end funds. They have been in business a long time. They
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are good funds. They are well managed. They trade for a commis-
sion, but they continue to sell at a very substantial discount because
the commission is inadequate for an investment which tends to be
held rather than traded.
One more comment. Yesterday there was a lot of conversation
about management fees. Mr. Phillips scared the hell out of me this
morning when he commented that 5 per cent was fairer than 9 per
cent. I take that back to yesterday's conversation, when we talked
about "fairness." 2
Mr. Phillips also talked about the comparability of fund shares
to other securities. Only through a fund can the investor be assured
of what I call the attributes of equity investing-that is, the purchase
of a cross-section of securities under supervision. That is what you
get when you buy a fund. There isn't a single stock that anybody
today can pick out with any assurance which ten years from now, or
five, or any other reasonable period, will share in the long-term growth
of the economy.
MR. LOEFFLER: To come back to the adequacy of the compensa-
tion for the retail effort, let me approach it from the point of view of
a businessman who must operate from specific statistical data.
I can only describe IDS from that standpoint, because it's the
only company on which I have data. IDS distributes only through
its own sales force. It has a force of four thousand sales representa-
tives who are full-time sales representatives of IDS, engaged only in
that employment. That's their only means of livelihood.
IDS does not subsidize the distribution of securities out of the
management fee. It doesn't subsidize the distribution of the securities
by using fund portfolio brokerage. So the distribution system is sup-
ported and must be supported, only from the sales load-from distribu-
tion income.
Considering the total distribution income, I should point out
that our investors obtain, in addition, free automatic reinvestment of
income dividends and capital gain distributions, and free transfer from
one fund to another, if their investment objectives change. If you
take the money invested by all methods and divide it by the gross
distribution income of IDS, you come out with an average sales load
of 4.37% per share.
IDS starts it sales load at eight, and graduates it down to one
percent for sales of $700,000 or more; when it's all totalled up, this
is what is available to support the distribution cost. I don't know
whether they have ever made one of those sales of $700,000 or more.
24 See text at p. 760 supra.
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I suppose I would know about it, if for no other reason than from
seeing the red flags wave outside the office of the Vice President of
Sales.
The average income of the IDS sales representative is $8,077, or
was for the year 1966. This was what was available for the average man
to support himself and his family. So when we talk about decreasing
the amount of the cost, we are talking about: is this too much for
this man to earn?
Let me say that there is very little profit in the distribution. It's
self-supporting, but barely, and I think this is true for a lot of
companies.
The Realities in Reducing the Sales Load
Now, in terms of objectives, I would say that we do not differ
from the Commission. IDS would love very much to bring down the
eight per cent beginning figure. We'd dearly love to do so, even the sales
force, because to the extent you incur resistance to the sale of mutual
funds, they tell me, you do incur it from the sales load. In that sense
the sales load is competitive, and I do differ with the idea that there
is no competition. There is. You are competing for dollars with
a lot of other alternative uses-and I mean investment uses-that the
customer has for his money.
IDS has studied the sales load structure to see if there is any
way that distribution can be done for less and has not yet come up
with an answer. Now it's all very reassuring, if I say to our Vice
President of Sales: Bill, don't worry. The lawyers at the Commission
tell me to just have faith, because they have faith that if they impose
a five percent limitation, you will be able to devise some ingenious plan
by which you can support the sales force. I have told him that, but
so far it hasn't given him any comfort at all.
Arriving at a Sales Load Rate
I think it's a pragmatic problem. The real question is: what is
the right figure, then? We are told that the five percent figure is
really not defensible. I was going to ask where it came from, but
now I don't need to. The businessmen tell me the right figure is the
eight per cent on down we're using, because that's what's needed to
support the distribution cost. If that is the figure which is necessary
to support the distribution cost, and that's what we are charging, I
don't know where the problem is. Why is there a need for regulation?
I think this can be demonstrated by many others on the basis of their
own figures and experience.
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PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: Gordon mentioned the nine per cent figure
presently in the Investment Company Act, which is explicitly applicable
only to completed contractual plans. Congress picked that figure at
a time when the load on completed contractual plans tended to average
13.39 per cent. There, Congress saw the pre-existing figure, and
had no hesitation in adopting a lower figure.
More generally, I think Gordon's remarks typify an attitude that
we have heard today and yesterday-that if there is a problem and
if the Commission does not have the perfect answer that can be de-
fended by slide rule techniques as the perfect answer, we must do
nothing. If society proceeded on that basis, we would not progress.
Precise judgments simply cannot be made with slide rule accuracy in
this area.
I note that the industry is not saying: we don't like the SEC
proposals, and we support Dr. Friend's counterproposals. I am quite
close to the line concerning his counterproposals. Perhaps the best
answer is to introduce competition by giving full knowledge and com-
parative data to all investors in the prospectus, and by repealing
section 22 (d).
PROFESSORIAL VIEWS ON THE SALES LOAD
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Irwin, I said I'd give you two minutes.
DR. FRIEND: I'll address myself rapidly to the comments made
by several people here on the panel.
First, turning to Mr. Phillips, I find it a little surprising that,
since the Commission's position has to be based on the absence of
price competition, it does not address itself to the basic cause of that
deficiency-the inability of investors to appraise the product they are
buying. I must confess that I don't recall any discussion of this point
in the report. If it is there, I did not see it.
Second, in view of the uncertainty, on which we all agree, at-
tached to the implications of these different approaches to the problem,
I would think that he would want to start with the mildest approach,
the one which is addressed specifically to what I think we agree is the
basic cause of the deficiency which exists-and then go on to more
heroic measures if they turn out to be desirable. And I would find
the repeal of section 22(d) much more economically justifiable, since
it is addressed specifically to a deficiency that exists, and is not
arbitrary.
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Third, he mentioned that I implied the sales load should be used
to moderate the flow of funds into the equity market. I did nothing
of the sort. I simply implied that the Commission should be con-
cerned not only with the investor welfare type of consideration that
they usually look at, but also with the over-all social welfare. The
Commission, at least in law, does have such a responsibility, though,
I think, since it's basically run by lawyers, it does not pay adequate
attention to the economic implications of its acts.
Incidentally, just to correct a factual misconception, it is not
true that we don't have adequate data on turnover rates in mutual
fund shares. We do have, and they are, as I recall, less than half of
the turnover rates for the exchange securities as a whole.
Turning to Mr. Loomis' comments, I don't understand the basis
for considering that a comparison of the selling charges of the funds
and of non-fund shares is relevant, so long as, first, there is no ex-
orbitant or non-competitive return which is being received from the
selling operation-and this I think we all agree is true-and, second,
there is no indication that mutual fund shareholders as a whole suffer
as a result of the current operations of the system.
Turning next to some of the other comments. Mr. Henderson
does not consider the sales charge a problem area. He never indi-
cated-at least to me-why this was so. He did not seem to deny
the fact that there is investor ignorance in this area, or that it is
desirable, if possible, to lower selling costs. Although he said that he
thought investors are always free to buy no-load funds, I don't really
think, and I wonder whether he thinks, that's realistic in terms of the
state of investor knowledge.
I might refer to a Wharton School Study both in reply to this
comment by Mr. Henderson and in reply to a comment by Mr. Grant
that there is not as much ignorance as I thought, or was implying, on
the part of investors as to alternatives. This study, which I consider
a pretty good one, does indicate, on the basis of a fairly comprehensive
sample of investors, that investor knowledge of alternatives open to
them is pretty low.25
Moreover, in connection with Mr. Henderson's comments, I
didn't hear a single argument which really applied to either of my two
suggested alternatives. He only opposed the five per cent sales maxi-
mum, which I also don't like.
Further, in connection with Mr. Grant's comments, again I don't
know that he has said anything which would take issue with my two
25 SEC Special Study of Markets, Pt. 4, ch. XI, 144.
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suggested alternatives, particularly the full disclosure alternative. Even
if he is right that investors aren't as ignorant as I think they are-
and as I said, there is some factual basis for my disagreement with
him-I don't see what harm results from adopting my suggested full-
disclosure alternative.
Finally, Mr. Loeffler said that he feels it's necessary to look
at the figures to determine whether persons "engaged in the dis-
tribution process" are making exorbitant profits, and if they are not
what is the issue all about? Clearly, salesmen have to be paid to sell;
underwriters have to be paid to wholesale the shares. I think that
rather misses the point.
It has already been granted several times this morning that at
the selling end no one is making exorbitant profits; but the point,
rather, is that clearly you can fix sales charges at different levels, and
if you want to pay a twenty per cent sales commission, you probably
could sell a lot more. No one is going to be getting an exorbitant
profit, but the economy might be a lot worse off as a result. The
fact that there are not exorbitant profits is not really relevant to
this issue.
TiH:E CONTRACT-AL PLAN METHOD OF FINANCING
FuND SHARE SALiES
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I know that all of you have more com-
ments to make in this area, but we must move on. I would like to
direct your attention now to the Commission's recommendations in
the contractual plan area.
I would like Dick Phillips to begin by explaining the Commis-
sion's recommendations.
THE COMMISSION'S POSITION
MR. PHILLIPS: At the outset I think it ought to be made clear
that the Commission did not recommend the abolition of the con-
tractual plan itself-by that I mean abolition of the custodial arrange-
ment and the custodial fee which pays administrative expenses for
handling small investments, for sending reminder notices, and for
various other features of the contractual plan. The Commission rec-
ommended the abolition of the front-end load by amending the provi-
sions of the Act which allow up to 50 per cent of the investor's first
year's payments to be deducted as sales load based on the entire amount
that would be invested if the investor completes the plan.
28
26 Investment Company Act § 27(a) (2), 54 Stat. 829 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80
(a)-27(a) (2) (1964).
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The Effect of the Front-End Load
Now, a contractual plan investor who in fact does complete his
plan pays no more sales load than the voluntary plan purchaser, but
the effect of the front-end load on the first year's payments is a drama-
tic one. Compare a contractual plan holder with a voluntary plan
holder, both of whom seek to accumulate $6,000 in fund shares by
paying $50 a month for ten years. They would both pay a total sales
load of $510 on their $6,000 investment in a fund with an 8.5 per cent
load. On the voluntary plan, where the sales load is deducted evenly
from each payment, the load would amount to $51 on the first year's
payments of $600. On a $600 investment in a contractual plan,
$300 would be deducted for sales load in the first year, and a
lower sales load deducted from subsequent payments. The effect of a
front-end load is simply this: the investor pays, and the salesman
receives, about six times more sales compensation on the first year's
payments on a contractual plan than if the same amount had been
invested through a voluntary plan.
The Commission's report, of course, points out that the front-end
load has an impact on all contractual plan investors, whether or not they
complete their plans. This is so because during the early years all
contractual plan holders have less money at work for them than in-
vestors who have paid an equal amount under a voluntary plan. In
our example of the $6,000, ten-year plan, the voluntary plan purchaser
would have $549 invested from his first twelve payments totaling
$600. But the contractual plan holder would have only $294 of the
$600 invested in fund shares, assuming a one per cent custodian's fee.
2 7
But the prime concern is the impact of the front-end load on con-
tractual plan purchasers who do not complete their plans. Both the
statistics of the Commission's Special Study and statistics developed
from data submitted to the Commission by the Association of Mutual
Fund Plan Sponsors make clear that a substantial proportion of inves-
tors in fact are in that category. The Special Study found that three-
and-a-half years after the plans were purchased, over 35 per cent of
the accounts surveyed had become inactive either because investors had
redeemed or because they had made no payments for a period of at
least one year.28 Sixteen per cent of all plan holders had made no
payments beyond the first year.29 These people paid an effective sales
load of 50 per cent on the amount invested. That's a sales charge of
2 Custodian fees normally are not charged in connection with voluntary plans.




100 per cent on the amount actually invested in fund shares. For
each dollar of fund shares they paid a dollar of sales load.
The data submitted by the Plan Sponsors showed the payment
status of all contractual plan accounts opened ten or twelve years pre-
viously by four large contractual plan sponsors. It reveals that ten
and twelve years after a plan has been opened, and at a time when
the schedule provided for completion, from 25 per cent to 43 per cent
of the accounts had made no payments beyond the first three years.
About half of these accounts had not paid more than the first year's
installments, on which the front-end load was deducted.3
Rejected Justifications for Front-End Loads
In arriving at its recommendation, the Commission also had the
benefit of an extensive rebuttal of the Special Study findings submitted
by the Plan Sponsors, and the report discusses in some detail what
the Commission considered to be the four main arguments raised in
defense of the front-end load by the Plan Sponsors3 1
The report considered-and rejected-the argument that the front-
end load was a stimulus to systematic investing. This is not surpris-
ing, since the Plan Sponsors' own data indicated that ten to twelve
years after the plans were initiated, less than one-half of the plan holders
had finally completed them, and from one-third to three-fifths of the
plan holders had made less than one-half of the scheduled payments.3
2
The Report makes the point that the front-end load structure
itself is a poorly designed stimulant to systematic investment, since
one-half and sometimes as much as four-fifths of the total sales load
to be paid on a completed plan is deducted from the first year's pay-
mentsY Thus the commissions available to salesmen as incentives to
persuade their customers to continue payments after the first year are
very small.
The Commission's report also rejected the argument that dis-
closures pertaining to the front-end load are an adequate protection for
investors. The fact is that disclosure cannot be meaningful for the
kind of decision that a contractual plan purchaser is forced to make
when he enters a plan. He has to make a determination that for
a period of ten or twelve or more years he'll have the willingness, the
determination and the capacity to keep up the payments. Few inves-
tors enter into plans thinking that they will not complete them, but
the high percentages of lapses and redemptions show that many of
30 This data is still unavailable to the public.
31 SEC Mutual Fund Report 240-46.
32 See note 30 supra.
33 SEC Mutual Fund Report 230.
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them are not in a position to make a forecast of their future willingness
and ability in a realistic way.
The Plan Sponsors also have defended the front-end load by
arguing that only a few investors, including those who redeemed or
lapsed in their payments at an early stage, have suffered a loss on
their investment. During the period of generally rising price markets
and during the period in which I believe only one or two funds showed
a negative investment performance, the Plan Sponsors' own statistics
showed that in two of the four plans, losses would have been incurred
by 33 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively, of all account holders after
ten or twelve years.3 This is because of the front-end load, and for
no other reason, since the underlying funds during this period showed
appreciation.
Moreover, the Commission's report adopts the view expressed
in the Special Study that traditionally in the securities business the
reasonableness of a sales charge is not judged by the ultimate success
or failure of the investment, but by the relationship of the sales charge
to the amount invested. On this basis, there seems to be no justifica-
tion for the sales loads, which can run as high as one hundred per cent
of the amounts invested or higher, paid by a substantial portion of
contractual plan holders who in fact do not complete their plans.
The Plan Sponsors basically argue that the front-end load is a
necessary incentive if small investors are to be provided with oppor-
tunities for fund investments. The Commission's report does not deny
that abolition of the front-end load will have an effect upon the sales
effort for contractual plans. The report questions, however, whether
imposition of a front-end load is a means which justifies the objective
of selling efforts in connection with contractual plans.
The report, of course, realizes that salesmen of insurance, for
example, are also compensated by a front-end load. It doesn't believe,
however, that insurance commission arrangements are an appropriate
basis for evaluating sales charges for the relatively high-risk mer-
chandise of securities. To the extent that those who buy insurance
pay a front-end load, they do so to get death protection, and regardless
of the sales load, they get the full amount of that protection from the
time they make their payment. People buy contractual plans pri-
marily to invest in securities, but because of the front-end load they
achieve only a small portion of their objective at the time they make
their first payment.
The basic issue here, I think is this: should sales to small investors
be financed by imposing a substantial risk, in addition to the normal
34 See note 30 supra.
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investment risks, on that class of investors who can least afford to
assume it? Should the substantial proportion-perhaps not a majority,
but a substantial minority-of the investors who do not complete their
plans and who pay sales loads of more than 25 cents, 50 cents, and
one dollar on every dollar that they actually invest in securities-
should they finance the selling efforts of the contractual plan industry?
The Commission believes not.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Did I hear the beginning of faint
applause?
MR. HENDERSON: That was a pin dropping.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Mr. Roach?
THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONTRACTUAL PLAN
MR. CORNELIUS ROACH: As the growth of contractual plans has
attracted attention, there has been an increased volume of comment
about them, and seemingly without examination, analysis or serious
thought, many commentators and some regulators have automatically
pegged contractual plans as just another security, have assigned them
to the securities business, and have undertaken to judge and value them
and their offering by tests and standards generally applied to listed and
over-the-counter securities. Now, this assignment is clearly erroneous.
While contractual plans are, by legal definition, "securities," those
who offer them are primarily engaged in the thrift business. The
plans they offer are long-term plans of accumulation involving nu-
merous payments of relatively small sums of money and competitive
with thrift plans offered by commercial banks, savings banks, savings
and loan associations, building and loan associations and life insurance
companies. Thrift plans have only superficial similarity to listed and
over-the-counter securities.
General Benefits
These plans have been described as complex. They are that, and
something more. They can very properly be described as sophisticated
plans for ordinary people. To support this thesis I'm going to review
the elements of a contractual plan.
First, they provide for the investment of relatively small sums
of money.
They provide for regular investments over terms of years.
They provide broad diversification in selected securities.
They provide continuous professional investment management
of the underlying portfolio.
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They provide for the compounding of shares through the auto-
matic reinvestment of all dividends and distributions without addi-
tional sales costs.
They provide for the application of the principle of dollar-cost-
averaging, which results in a better-than-average cost position.
They provide opportunity for participation, through equity invest-
ing, in the average annual growth and productivity of American busi-
ness and industry, amounting to some 2 to 3 per cent per year.
They provide opportunity for participation through equity invest-
ment in the average annual increase in market value of equities brought
about by inflationary pressures.
They provide flexibility, in that payments may be regular, accel-
erated or postponed, all without penalty, and do not lapse in the sense
that a life insurance contract may lapse.
They are redeemable at full value on any market day, with no
waiting for a quarter-annual or semi-annual date or a buyer.
They may be used as collateral for borrowing.
At the end of the line, whenever the plan holder desires, he may
liquidate or convert his plan to shares which he may liquidate wholly
or partially as his needs require. If his investment has totaled
$10,000-and some require less-or has become worth that amount,
he may establish an automatic withdrawal plan of X number of dollars
or the liquidation of X number of shares, payable monthly. His
accumulation plan has become an annuity funded by equities.
Now, add to this the fact that since the plans are securities by
definition, there has been full disclosure to the investor of the sales
charge, the amounts and manner in which it is to be deducted and
disclosure of all other costs and pertinent facts.
Features Peculiar to Contractual Plans
In addition, there are special features peculiar to contractual plans.
These provide a definite investment goal of an amount certain; for
example, $2,000 or $5,000.
By reason of the front-end sales charge, these plans provide moti-
vation, or, if you prefer, discipline and encouragement designed to
promote persistence, which is vital to the success of any long-term
thrift program. In the make-up of these plans there is the short-term
goal to get the substantial part of the sales charge paid and out of
the way, and the long-term goal to be achieved at relatively small
current cost.
With these plans there is available low-cost completion life insur-
ance in forty-two states.
Most plans also provide that, if needed or desired, the plan holder
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may liquidate up to 90 per cent of the current value of his plan and
later replace his investment without sales cost.
There is also the fact that sponsors accounting for some 70 per
cent of the total contractual plan business-that is, members of the
Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors Association-give each new plan holder
thirty days to examine his plan-and himself-and decide whether to
request his money back or keep his plan.
There is also the fact that, because of the front-end sales charge,
these plans are more apt to bring a salesman to explain and instill
confidence in the favorable results that can reasonably be expected from
an investment in American business and industry over a long term
of years.
When these elements and features are considered, the contractual
plan becomes something quite different from a share of stock pur-
chased for cash on a stock exchange or over-the-counter, and takes
on the characteristics of a ten-, fifteen-, or twenty-year endowment
contract, a savings program offered by life insurance companies, from
which the sales charge structure of contractual plans was borrowed.
The Performance of Contractual Plans
Anyone offering a long-term plan of accumulation-that is, a
thrift plan-is in truth and in fact offering end results. And anyone
buying a thrift plan is in reality, hopefully, buying end results. Con-
tractual plans have produced and are producing splendid end results.
On a hypothetical basis, the summary results of a $2500 plan
offered by one sponsor for every ten-year period from 1941-1950 to
1956-1965 produced total liquidating values at the end of each such
ten-year period-and there were sixteen of such periods-varying from
a low end result of $4,282 to a high end result of $7,441. For purposes
of comparison, an equivalent investment at fixed interest of 4 per cent,
compounded quarterly, would have produced $3,722.
Here is my own experience. On March 23, 1950, I began the
purchase of a series of six contractual plans aggregating $17,500
face amount, with all payments completed on June 11, 1959. These
six plans, on which over the nine-year period I paid a total of $17,500,
were, on January 20, 1967, worth in the aggregate $54,429.
Now, in connection with that series of plans there were 103 pay-
ments, and our principal accounting officer tells me that each one of
those payments involved thirty-six operations, so that over the life
of those plans 3700 operations were involved in servicing those plans.
My experience is not isolated. I have here the record of all the
plans sold by one sponsor in the year 1956, and I am looking at the
record of where those plans stood at August 31, 1966, ten years later.
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In 1956, this sponsor sold 15,203 plans, of which 385 were converted
to shares, leaving 14,818 plans. Of these, 7,682 plans were still open
on August 31, 1966, and on these 7,682 plans $22.8 million had been
paid, and the plans had become worth $39.5 million, a gain of $16.7
million.
Five thousand one hundred sixty-seven of these plans had been
liquidated with a gain. On these plans $14.1 million had been paid,
and on liquidation $20.1 million was realized, a gain of $6 million.
The remaining 1969 plans had been discontinued by liquidation
at a loss. On these plans $2.177 million had been paid, and they had
been liquidated for $1.895 million, a loss of $282,000.
So here we have a gain of $22.8 million achieved or realized by
86.7 per cent of the total number of plan holders, against the loss of
$282,000 taken by 13.3 per cent of the total number. Other sponsors
have comparable or superior records.
Now, our research discloses that less than one-half of those
liquidating with losses in the early stages were forced to do so by need
or emergency. The majority exercise a free choice, with the most
frequent reason being simply a change of investment objective. In
subscribing to his plan, each plan holder has the opportunity to test
his ability to carry out a long-term investment objective. It's per-
fectly clear that in making that test each risks a relatively small sum
of money.
It is significant that the record here reveals that every plan holder
who used his plan or gave it time to work for him achieved a gain.
The ultimate fact is that every single plan holder included in this
record had an opportunity to achieve good investment results. Those
that did not were prevented from doing so only by terminating their
plans before they had had a chance to do so.
These plans do produce satisfactory end results, and, as long as
our economy maintains its present course, can reasonably be expected
to continue to produce good end results.
The Typical Contractual Plan Purchaser
Now, who buys contractual plans? The most recent survey of
mutual fund plan shareholders is dated January, 1966 and was con-
ducted by Benson & Benson for the Investment Company Institute.
It presents the following findings with regard to contractual plan
holders&5
Their median age is 43.1.




Their occupations are: professional, 27.5 per cent; executive and
administrative, 21.7 per cent; clerical and sales, 12.1 per cent; skilled
and semi-skilled, 21.2 per cent; housewives, 1.2; retired, 2.1. Others,
14.2.
The median yearly family income is $11,100. The median value
of mutual fund holdings is $2,485. The median life insurance held
is $13,050. The median bank account and U.S. Savings Bonds is
$2,055. The median value of the home lived in is $17,000.
The contractual plan holder, then, is mature, is likely to be in
the professional, executive, administrative, clerical or sales classifica-
tion, has a substantial annual family income, has substantial life in-
surance in force, has some $2,000 in quick assets, and lives in a home
valued at some $17,000.
It is a matter of particular interest and significance that the pro-
fessions represent the highest percentage of the occupations which
have bought contractual plans. Although relatively few in number
as a class, the professions represent education, experience, intelligence
and judgment, and it is a source of satisfaction and some pride that
the professions have by their purchases evidenced their approval of
contractual plans.
By the same token, the growing use of contractual plans is really
a compliment to the members of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and its staff, the representatives of industry, and the members
of Congress who in 1940 cooperated to formulate the make-up and
mechanics of these plans. Their combined effort produced a prudent,
effective and rewarding thrift plan, an endowment plan funded by
equities, which fits admirably the economy of our times and the needs
of the provident and ambitious members of our society.
PROFESSOR MUNDREIM: In listening to the comments of both
Dick Phillips and Cornelius Roach, it strikes me that one thing we
might probe a little bit more deeply is that part of the Commission's
analysis which relates to the large number of people who started con-
tractual plans but did not carry them through, aird thus incurred the
penalty of the higher load.
I know that some people find this the most disturbing aspect of
the analysis of contractual plan sales. I know that Ray Grant has
been concerned about this finding. Would you comment on how one
might meet that deficiency?
AN INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO THE C MMISSION CRITICISMS
MR. GRANT: I think the industry owes a debt of gratitude to
the Special Study because it brought some of these deficiencies to our
1967]
816 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:769
attention. I can only tell you what we did about these deficiencies, in
the hope that our response might be one part of the answer.
Self-Regulation by the Industry
One of the things which I found deficient in the report was that
there was really no followup of what has happened to the contractual
plan business since 1963, when the Special Study was first published.
Actually, responsible members of the industry took this report very
seriously, and stepped back from their own businesses to take a look
at what was going on. The finding that thirty-five per cent of our
customers, if the figures are accurate, were paying sales loads of
between eighteen and fifty per cent, gave us some reason to question
our own activities.
I know what we did, and I know that what we did was not
unusual in the industry because many others did the same. We
took a good look at our sales organization. We restructured it. We
prepared for much tighter supervisory procedures. We beefed up our
legal staff, and placed them in charge of establishing supervisory
procedures, and, in fact, reviewing transactions on a daily basis.
We tightened our recruiting requirements. We tightened our
training and supervisory requirements. And, quite frankly, we dis-
missed about 2,000 sales representatives from our organization, on
the theory that they were not devoting sufficient time to properly
following up and servicing their clients. We were not terribly in-
terested in retaining people who made an occasional sale, and then
didn't do anything but collect commissions.
In addition, we have established certain procedures for obtaining
records from our custodian bank that indicate to us exactly how
effective these measures are. The figures developed by the bank
indicated those accounts which were delinquent and there were
followups on those accounts to find out why they were delinquent.
Although the period is too short to determine how effective we
have been, I would like to give you the figures. For the seventeen-
month period from August 1, 1965 to the end of 1966, we had a
3.3 per cent delinquency rate, based upon the following definition of
delinquency, which is somewhat different from the one used by the
Special Study. Bearing in mind the flexibility of the contractual plan
itself which allows for accelerations and decelerations in payment, we
consider an account delinquent which is twenty-five per cent behind
in scheduled payments, and in which no payment has been made
within the last three months.
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Now, that's arbitrary. I don't know whether it signifies any-
thing. I think that over a long term it certainly will be significant,
although in seventeen months it's relatively inconclusive.
But we think that the answer here is to tighten supervision. You
know that the salesman has an economic interest in the first year of
activities. You know that the firm has a more significant interest in
the trail than in the first year's activities. These seem to be adverse
interests, but if you set the ground rules tight enough, with enough
muscle behind them to force your sales staff, under threats of termina-
tion, to follow up on delinquent accounts, you may have an answer.
You may also have an answer in the sense that they will qualify
their customers much more carefully.
At least this is the attempt that we have made and are making.
I would have hoped that between the time the Special Study was
published and the time this report was written, the Commission would
have had the opportunity to take another look at the impact of their
own Special Study, which I don't think they fully recognized. The
industry was trying in every way to upgrade its standards and upgrade
its people, so that its customers would not be hurt. It doesn't help
the customer, it doesn't help the salesmen, and it surely doesn't help
the firm to have delinquent accounts.
Compensation of Contractual Plan Salesmen
I don't know whether this is the time, but if I have one more
minute I would like to put this problem into arithmetical terms.
Under our schedules, if we had a good salesman-a full-time sales-
man-who went out and devoted forty hours a week and did a well-
supervised job and was able to sell ten $50 monthly programs per
month, with an initial payment of $100 on each program, which is a
double payment, based on ten-year volume-such a man would be
placing, under our arithmetic, $60,000 per month face amount of
plans on the books. On the twelve-and-a-half-year programs he would
be placing, on a regular basis, $75,000 per month face amount of plans
on the books. This kind of man is exceptional in our industry. He
would be very, very good for any firm.
Under present standards he would have made gross commissions
of $12,375 during the year, against which he would have had to
pay all the expenses I delineated previously. He might net out about
$10,000 in his first year on that basis.
Under the proposed legislation this same man, with a maximum
sales charge of 4.76 per cent, which would permit him about a 2Y2 per
cent commission, if he sold ten $50 a month plans with a double initial
payment, assuming full persistency in all of his programs, would earn
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$25 in his first month. By the twelfth month he would be earning at
the rate of $300 per month, and his total for the first year would have
been gross commissions of $1,800. I would ask: on what basis
could we attract the kind of professional salesmen we are looking for
and are asked to find in this business?
The question then logically is: so what? Mutual funds are not
necessary for everybody, and perhaps some of the people we are selling
shouldn't be buying them. What we are trying to arrive at, between
the industry and the regulators, hopefully, is some way of bringing
mutual funds to that vast segment of the American people for whom
mutual funds in modest amounts on a monthly basis are suitable
investments. There is a large, indefinable, amorphous group of
Americans who have a good, steady wage, who have all the protection
of hospitalization, medical programs and pensions for whom mutual
funds in modest amounts are suitable.
My question is: how in the world can you make it economically
possible for a good salesman to bring this mutual fund message on a
voluntary program basis to such potential investors?
Just one last point. Proceeding on the theory that people do not
buy funds-that they in fact are sold funds-which I know to be true,
although apparently it's still a matter of dispute, I think we are faced
with two options: one option is to keep something like the present
structure-something like it, with a lot more tightening of controls
in terms of supervision, qualification, suitability and whatever else
the industry can really absorb; the alternative option is preclude this
group from equity investments in mutual funds, because there will be
nobody who can possibly bring the story to them.
Another Type of Contractual Plan Financing
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: You raise the need to keep the front-end
load as the only way adequately to finance the sales effort. I think
we can turn very usefully to Bob Loeffler, because IDS, which is one
of the most successful of the fund selling organizations, didn't have
any kind of front-end load program for a long time. Then in the
early sixties, when IDS began to explore this problem, it came out
with a solution which is somewhat different from the kind of plan
which is sold by your organization, Investors Planning Corporation.
I wonder, Bob, whether you can (a) briefly describe the IDS
system, and (b) evaluate whether or not that kind of financing of
salesmen's compensation has proven workable.
MR. LOEFFLER: The IDS plan was first made available for dis-
tribution and offered on October 1, 1965, so our experience with it to
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date is limited by the fact that we have only been doing this for about
eighteen months.
The IDS plan is relatively simple to distinguish from the others.
It's often referred to as a spread load. Under the IDS contractual
plan 20 per cent of the first year's payments are deducted as sales load,
18 per cent of the second year's payments, 18 per cent of the third
year's payments, 7 per cent of the fourth year's payments, and there-
after it's 4.2 per cent of the remaining payments.
The plan goes for 122 years, 150 monthly payments. The
over-all sales charge, upon completion, would be 8 per cent.
Also the plan holder has the option to continue payments for
another additional ten year period after the twelve-and-a-half-year
period at a 4 per cent sales load. Thus, if the plan holder wished
to continue the plan for the full period for which the option to do so
is available, the average sales load for the full period would be 6.2
per cent.
If a plan holder wishes to continue investing after the initial
12Y2 year period, it is to his advantage to continue the plan because
of the reduced load at that point.
In the approximately eighteen months that the plan has been
offered, 58,251 plans have been sold with a total face amount of $274
million.
The experience to date on redemptions, which I think is interest-
ing, has been very much like that which Ray was describing under
their new procedures. To date the termination rate on the plans-
those where the customer has cancelled out and discontinued the pay-
ments, or where there has been a suspension of payments for over a
period of time, or where the customer never made six consecutive pay-
ments-is 2.3 per cent of the plans. So the experience has been very
favorable.
Also, the plan is limited to investments of no more than $100 a
month. The plan was devised to reach a market which IDS could not
otherwise reach-the customer who does not have any accumulated
funds for investment but who is in a position to make a small monthly
payment and to accumulate funds in that way. Thus the plan is
available at $20 a month, and currently the average size of the monthly
payment is $31.26.
IDS has always had, and still has, a voluntary accumulation plan
available, but it requires a minimum down payment of $300 and a
payment of $50 a month thereafter. The contractual plan was de-
signed primarily for customers not in a position to invest on this
voluntary basis. If there is any indication that a customer is in a
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position where the voluntary program would be more appropriate,
under our new business acceptance procedures, our salesmen must
obtain a written explanation of why a contractual plan rather than
a voluntary plan was sold to the customer.
The persistency so far is much greater under the contractual plan
than under the voluntary plans.
I think that I feel very much as Ray, in the sense that I think
a large part of the solution of the problem with respect to contractual
plans is in the sales procedures used to sell them. Contractual plans
simply should not be sold to a person for whom they are not appropriate,
and I think that it's a sales practice problem as much as-or more
than-anything else.
In that context I would like to say that IDS in its sales policy
has long had its own suitability requirement, which reads as follows:
Every effort must be made to understand the customer's
personal and financial situation, so that the manager, or sales
representative, will have reasonable grounds for believing that
the investment plan is suitable for the customer and within
his means.
This requirement is most important, particularly with respect to
contractual plans.
I should say one other thing about our contractual plan. When I
said it's limited to a maximum of $100 a month, that requires explana-
tion, since there are very few plans involving that large a monthly pay-
ment. Another provision of the plan is that it cannot be prepaid. We
feel if a customer has enough money to prepay a plan, then he can make
lump sum payments and doesn't need to go to the contractual route.
Thus, there is another acceptance procedure on contractuals: they
cannot be prepaid in other than a limited amount until they have been
in effect for three years. At that point, because the reduced load
comes into effect, the plan holder does have the option of a complete
pay-up, if he wishes.
THE IMPACT OF FORBIDDING THE FRONT-END LOAD
PROFESSOR MUNDREIM: There is one additional point which a
number of questions from the floor raise. If you forbid the front-end
load, don't you, in effect, underwrite a movement of mutual fund
salesmen into insurance selling where a front-end load is permitted.
Such a trend gives an impetus to the sale of endowment policies,
whole life policies and various forms of annuity contracts with the
result that money now flowing into the equity markets may be re-




MR. LOEFFLER: I want to make one comment because of its
particular appropriateness to IDS. The IDS sales representative
offers life insurance and fixed income securities, so that these options
are also available. Nevertheless, only a relatively small percentage
of the total income of sales representatives comes from the sale of
life insurance and fixed income securities.
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: Bob, abolition of the front-end load might
have the effect you suggested. But several points should be made.
First, insurance and mutual fund shares are not interchangeable.
One accomplishes one thing, and the other accomplishes something
else. Thus the salesman selling both, as at IDS, must take a rather
careful look at the over-all situation and see that what he sells is
appropriate to his customer's needs. Second, the Commission's rec-
ommendations would not limit custodians' fees. Also, to the extent
that there is-to use this term, "persistency"-in a level load con-
tractual plan, as compared with a front-end load contractual plan, the
sales compensation over the life of the plan is the same; in those cir-
cumstances it's a question of paying the salesman a larger percentage
at the beginning. The front-end load also creates suitability problems.
There may have been some change in the industry, but at one point
people were upset when suitability was mentioned; it was a rather
nasty word. I am happy to hear two industry men here endorsing
the concept. In my mind, the overriding consideration is the injus-
tice of the higher-than-normal sales load-up to 50 per cent (or 100
per cent)-paid by the fellow who terminates or lapses.
PROFESSOR MITNDHEIM: Are you suggesting that the front-end
load really is important only as a method of financing a salesman's
compensation? Thus the larger organizations like IDS, IPC, and
maybe some of the conglomerates will find it easier to work out
something than a smaller retailer who won't be able to provide such
financing. The large organizations can generate financing internally,
particularly if they are confident about the rate of persistency of
investment.
MR. LOEFFLER: Bob, I think we might send up a comment such
as the one that came up from the New York Stock Exchange member
this morning."
Elimination of the Front-End Contractual Plan
MR. ROACH: I might say that I wonder if there is a difference
of understanding. There is no doubt in my mind but that the recom-
36 See text at p. 794 mipra.
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mendation of the Special Study is to eliminate the front-end sales
charge. And when you have eliminated that, you have eliminated
the front-end contractual plan. Let there be no mistake about that.
I'm sure that the plans presently outstanding will continue, and
I think that was the sense and intention of the Commission, but the
elimination of the front-end sales charge certainly will eliminate the
contractual plan as it is presently known.
MR. LOEFFLER: It would eliminate the IDS plan as well as all
the others. There's no doubt about that.
MR. RoAcH: Let me respond to the question as to where the
salesmen would devote their efforts. I won't predict the future, but
in December, the month in which the report was issued-we had our
smallest plan month and our largest insurance month. (We are also
in the insurance business.) That rather foretells what the future
would bring if the contractual plan is eliminated.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Herb Anderson?
MR. ANDERSON: I simply would like to point out that the package,
including the five per cent limitation, would not only eliminate the
contractual or front-end plan, but also, in my opinion, would tend
largely to eliminate the voluntary plan, because I can't conceive of a
meaningful voluntary plan that would be able to be handled at a
5 or 4.7 per cent charge.
AN SEC REBUTTAL
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Phil?
MR. LooMIs: I first want to disagree slightly with Mr. Roach.
Elimination of the front-end load doesn't mean necessarily that the
essence of the accumulation plan is eliminated. There are alternatives,
certain types of voluntary plans, and the IDS type plan, or some
modification thereof, to offer to the investors all the services which
Mr. Roach has outlined. The real problem is not making this thing
available, but rather determining how the sales force is to be financed.
The Commission's position was that it should not be financed by
imposing what seemed to us an undue or unsupportable amount of
risk on those plan holders who either misinterpreted, or didn't under-
stand or were unable to predict their own financial desires and abilities
in the future.
Now, I recognize-and that's the real problem here--that a
salesman doesn't get very much under the level load plan-at the
moment we are not talking about what the level load is to be-when
he first makes a sale under this plan; and I would think that there
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could be created in one way or another devices to deal with that
problem and give the salesman a suitable initial payment without
putting the risk of the financing on small investors.
I agree also with Morgan that if the plan holder persists and
the salesman persists, the salesmen will ultimately get the same
amount of compensation in both cases.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Your comment suggests, Phil, that per-
haps the Commission's recommendation is broad enough to encompass
some kind of stretched-out load? Is that what you meant when you
said that something like Bob Loeffler's company's arrangement is
possible?
MR. LoomIs: No, the Commission's recommendation is for a
level load plan. This, however, doesn't mean, for example, that the
firm couldn't finance the salesman to some degree.
MR. LOEFFLER: I think, Bob, that is what I meant when I said
that it might be appropriate for IDS, and perhaps Waddell & Reed,
and maybe one or two others, to send up a nice "Thank you" note-
such as the member of the New York Stock Exchange sent up this
morning.
FINANciNG FIND SHR SAIms WITE IRECiJocAL Businwss
PROFESSOR MUNDHCEIM: Perhaps now we ought to turn to some
of the problems relating to reciprocal business. The phrase "reciprocal
business," has received some rather sinister connotations in discussions
in the last three or four years, but in its broadest aspects, reciprocal
business describes a universal business phenomenon.
BACKGROUND
The Commission's analysis of reciprocal business practices in
connection with the mutual fund industry tends to focus on sales
reciprocal, the attempt to reward the seller of fund shares by allocat-
ing to him, directly or indirectly, some of the fund's portfolio business.
The fund may place an order directly with the seller of mutual funds
or may direct that a portion of the commission earned on the execu-
tion of a portfolio transaction be given, through one of an increasing
number of routes, to the seller of fund shares.
Pressure for such sales reciprocals seems to be on the increase.
What started out as a plea for investing the dollars brought into the
fund portfolio, through the broker who was responsible for the inflow,
has developed into a highly organized system, both from the point
of view of the broker-dealer and from the point of view of the fund,
designed to maximize the reward for selling efforts.
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It is the pressures created by this highly organized system which
seem to be causing the Commission its concern.
The Areas of Concern
Among the areas of concern which the Commission identified are:
(1) Execution of transactions in markets which may not be
as favorable as other markets, either from the point of view of speed
of execution or price, but which do have the advantage of providing
better devices for making reciprocal business available.1
(2) A disposition to have higher turnover of portfolio securities
than may be dictated by investment considerations alone."8
In addition, the willingness of brokers to give up a large propor-
tion of the commission earned on the execution of mutual fund port-
folio transactions has made the Commission wonder whether or not
the public isn't becoming uneasy about the justification for charging
a commission-I'm here talking about the New York Stock Exchange
commission-which has so much apparent fat in it that brokers who
have performed no service in connection with the execution of the
transaction can be rewarded out of that commission.
The Beneficiaries of the Present System
One other aspect of reciprocal business practices also deserves
mention, and it relates to the beneficiaries of the present system, and
that's a point that I think we touched on, perhaps humorously, earlier
this morning. One of the beneficiaries is, of course, the larger funds.
They can use a larger portion of their portfolio business to reward
sales efforts, and the greater volume of their business permits them
to negotiate more favorable give-up ratios than the smaller funds.
The second beneficiary of the present system is the New York Stock
Exchange member firms. The reason for that is that it's just easier
to get reciprocal business commissions to them than to those people
who sell fund shares but are not members of the New York Stock
Exchange. And, finally, there is also a beneficial effect to those
markets which provide the best-I believe "gimmick" is the correct
word-for wide distribution of reciprocal business commissions.
That, I think, is the background as we find it in Chapter IV
of the report. Perhaps Phil will fill in whatever details he thinks would
be appropriate, and then perhaps he can go on to explain how the
problems which seem to be created in this area are met by the Com-
mission's recommendations.
37 SEC Muhial Fund Report 175-77.




MR. LooMIs: You have given a good outline of the problems
which the Commission saw. It's necessary at the outset to draw a
few distinctions.
In the first place, it has always been the practice for mutual funds,
and other persons having brokerage business to transact, to give that-
business to brokers who have conferred some benefit on them. This
is what is meant by "reciprocal" business, and it is generally pervasive
in the securities industry. The Commission took no steps to abolish
it, execpt in so far as it takes forms which are designed to evade any
prohibition which may be directed toward give-ups.
In the second place, it was always a practice, or it has been for
a long time a practice on the New York Stock Exchange, for member
firms to combine in various ways to perform the function of executing
an order. In some cases, one firm may originate the order, and
someone else may execute it, or a customer down in Florida may go
into an office of a broker there and ask that broker to direct the order
for execution to his own broker in New York.
Again the Commission has not proposed that where more than
one broker plays a necessary part in the execution of an order, the
commission should not be divided. I emphasize the "necessary."
We do not propose, if the typical give-up which we are objecting to
ceases to exist, that it be replaced by paperwork which serves no
useful purpose and increases the cost of executing transactions, merely
to provide a substitute.
Customer-Directed Cash Give-Ups
Finally, there is the customer directed cash give-up, which is
part of the problem. This is a more recent phenomenon, and involves
the situation where a broker executing for a mutual fund is directed
by the fund to parcel out portions of his commission, sometimes up
to 60 per cent, to brokers named by the fund who had nothing to do
with the transaction, but have furnished some service to the fund-
ordinarily, the sale of fund shares. This has become a highly organized
procedure, with schedules made up by principal underwriters, with
careful records kept as to just who is entitled to what, and the regular
payment of the amounts, which are treated as practically an obligation,
and are ordinarily proportional to sales.
There are further refinements which the industry itself finds ob-
jectionable. For example, there is the one-shot promotion where a
large amount of brokerage is directed to particular brokers so that
they can reward the man who sells the most Fund A shares during a
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particular period. This is the sales contest. Also, cash give-ups are
directed through brokers to particular salesmen.
There are several problems with this to which Bob has alluded.
Beyond that, I guess I better get into another refinement. So far,
I have just dealt with the New York Stock Exchange, where probably
a predominance of mutual fund transactions are executed. But not all
dealers who sell mutual funds are members of the New York Stock
Exchange. Consequently various-what Bob referred to as "gim-
micks"-have developed, which are designed to get some of this
brokerage out to non-member firms.
Use of the Regional Exchange to Direct Give-Ups
The development is a rather interesting one. There have been
a number of non-member firms which were skillful in executing bloc
transactions as brokers, normally by finding both sides of the deal,
by knowing what securities institutional investors, mutual funds and
others might have an interest in buying or selling, and utilizing that
knowledge to place or to obtain securities that institutions want in
large blocs. This was a useful and an inexpensive service. They
found, however, that the mutual funds didn't particularly want it,
and that in order to survive competitively they would have to join a
regional exchange, which allowed the passage of give-ups to all mem-
bers of the NASD or to other people who are on a preferred list;
and so they joined regional exchanges, in effect raised their charges
and distributed give-ups. Mutual funds liked it better that way.
The regional exchanges saw that this was an opportunity, and
in recent years there has been a sort of race of diligence among the
various regional exchanges, particularly the smaller ones, to facilitate
the distribution of give-ups. On some exchanges, particularly some
of the very smallest, where there really isn't any auction market, all
that happens is that the broker or brokers who have found both sides
of the deal just telephone it out to somebody in an outlying exchange,
and it is crossed there, and give-ups are distributed. The whole
mechanism is completely non-functional, so to speak, in so far as
the execution of the customers' orders is concerned.
Bob has outlined some of the difficulties which the Commission
found with this situation, which may interfere with the best execution
of customers' orders. It creates an incentive to unnecessary turnover.
You can't prove whether that temptation is yielded to, in most instances.
It tends to favor the New York Stock Exchange member firms selling
mutual fund shares over the non-members selling mutual fund shares,
because of the gimmicks that have to be resorted to in order to
compensate the latter type of person; and, as the New York Stock
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Exchange has recently conceded, it raises questions concerning the
integrity of the commission rate structure itself.
The essential justification for fixed minimum commission rates
on exchanges is that brokers should be fairly compensated for their
service in executing orders, and that customers should be treated
equitably. The customer directed give-up isn't really consistent with
either of these ideals. The broker doesn't receive the compensation
which the structure designs for him-somebody else gets half of it
or more-and the mutual funds themselves are not equitably treated
in so far as their portfolio brokerage is utilized as additional sales
compensation, although the portfolio transactions are for the benefit
and are transactions of the fund, and not that of the underwriter or
the manager.
Volume Discounts and the Abolition of the Give-Up
For these reasons the Commission has, as outlined in more detail
in the report, requested the Exchange-the exchanges, really-to
abolish the customer directed give-up. 9 The Commission does not
need legislation to accomplish this purpose. It has power under section
19 of the Exchange Act to require changes in exchange rules with
respect to commissions, by order, after an administrative proceeding; 40
but so far it has proceeded on the basis of discussions with the Ex-
changes, rather than by formal legal proceedings. I would hope that
avenue could continue to be followed.
The New York Stock Exchange, as I say, in a statement released,
I believe, within a week or ten days, has discussed this matter.41 It's
a long and complex statement which is a little difficult to understand,
and maybe I don't understand it fully, but it does seem to manifest
a willingness to at least not fight too much against the abolition of
the customer directed give-up.
Intertwined, related, but not the same as the customer directed
give-up problem, is the problem of whether there should be a volume
discount on the exchanges. Obviously, as Bob has pointed out, if an
executing broker can give away 50 or 60 per cent of his commission
on a large institutional order, this gives rise to an inference that
perhaps the commission on that type of an order is higher than it needs
to be to compensate that broker for his service; and if the customer
directed give-up were abolished, there might develop a greater pressure
for a volume discount on the part of mutual funds and others than
now exists.
39 SEC Mtual Fund Report 185-86.
40 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 898, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78s
(b) (9) (1964).
41Letter From Keith Funston to the Exchange Community, Feb. 1, 1967.
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On the other hand, the devising of a suitable, equitable, workable
volume discount, and the consideration of its impact upon the financial
position of member firms, is a task of considerable complexity, and
it may be that the two problems don't have to be solved together as
one ball of wax.
I should mention also the fact that the customer directed give-up
is generally considered to be improper in the over-the-counter market,
where there is no minimum commission structure, and the compensa-
tion to executing brokers or dealers is negotiable. The States, the
Commission, and, I think, the industry generally, agree that customer
directed give-ups in the over-the-counter market are an improper prac-
tice; give-ups there represent an obvious and unnecessary diversion of
the fund's money to a purpose which is not necessary to the execution
of the transaction.
However, there has developed more recently pressure for some
devices to try to introduce give-ups on over-the-counter trades, in order
that those funds which invest in over-the-counter securities might be on
a par, in so far as their ability to give out sales compensation, with
those firms who invest in listed securities. These devices, fortunately,
have not progressed very far, though I suspect on the basis of what I
have heard that there are probably more improper attempts to arrive
at the equivalent of give-ups in over-the-counter transactions than
come to our attention.
In any event, this problem is another discriminatory aspect, in
that it gives the listed market an unfair advantage, it seems to us, or
at least a competitive advantage unrelated to efficiency in the execution
of orders, over the over-the-counter market, including the third market.
These, then, are some of the problems we see.
THE OPERATION OF RECIPROCAL BUSINESS IN
PORTFOLIO TRANSACTIONS
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Before we explore how the Commis-
sion's proposals would work, let me ask Herb Anderson to explain
how his fund, Group Securities, presently transacts its portfolio busi-
ness and how it gets reciprocal business to the sellers of its shares;
and then, Herb, after you have done that, perhaps you could explain
how the Commission's proposal to prohibit give-ups would affect
your fund's operation.
The Case for Industry Self-Regulation
MR. ANDERSON: Well, inasmuch as I have only fifteen minutes,
I can't cover that. So I would like to make what I believe to be
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general comments that are more basic, and we can get back to any
detail or any specific point that may be of interest.
I have been puzzling about how to get this organized, and it oc-
curred to me that someone had counted the words in the report, and
came up with the figure of 210,000. That total increased to about
Y4 million when the words in the Wharton Report were included;
which is pertinent because of its tie-in, both by philosophy and by the
many references to it in the other document. There are quite a few
more words in the Special Study, which is rather extensively incorpo-
rated by reference in the report-to use a phrase of the legal profes-
sion, of which I'm not a member, and, I guess, the only one on the
panel who is not.
While the chapter of the report with which I am now directly
concerned consists of only forty-five pages, there is a great deal more
which has been written and said in this area of portfolio transactions,
the manner and cost of their execution and how, and by whom, they
should be handled.
I take this much time out of my precious fifteen minutes to make
clear that, much as I would like to go through the chapter and the
other material point by point, this is not possible. Instead, I will
speak to what seem to me to be rather key points underlying these
proposals-or demands, as they have been called-relative to the
execution of portfolio transactions by mutual funds, and presumably
all other institutional accounts.
In the give-up letter of July 18 of last year, the statement was
made that:
We [the SEC] have found a general recognition in the
industry that the "give-up" practice in the exchange communi-
ties has developed to a point where it threatens the integrity
of wide segments of the securities industry.'
This is simply not so--yet the statement seems to be an im-
portant part of the base from which the later recommendations and
conclusions are made.
As in any human endeavor, some things are done that can
and should be criticized and corrected. Were these problem areas
approached in the same manner as those applying to sales litera-
ture in 1950, the industry could and would have responded and, in
my opinion, a sound result would have been achieved, as I think one
was in the writing of the Statement of Policy.' As evidence of a
42 Letter From Irving M. Pollack, Director of Division of Trading & Markets,
SEC to Securities Exchange Presidents, July 18, 1966.
43 SEC Statement of Policy Regarding Investment Company Sales Literature,
in NATIONAL AssociATiON OF SEcuRiTms DEALERs, MANuAL. 5101 (CCH 1967).
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desire by the great majority to conduct their business in the area
of reciprocals and elsewhere, in accordance with high standards of
commercial honor, I cite the adoption by the membership of the
Investment Company Institute (I.C.I.) of the Guide to Business
Standards in 1962."
But there is much more to this record. The I.C.I. has no power
of enforcement; and, while this is not true, cynics might say that the
Guide was no more than a self-serving statement of principles which
were generally intended to be ignored.
The NASD does have a considerable amount of authority over
its members-indeed, it administers enforcement of the Statement of
Policy (in so far as its members are concerned), at its own expense
and, in my opinion, more effectively than has been done otherwise with
respect to nonmembers.
In the area of reciprocal business, the NASD has consistently and
conscientiously tried for more than seven years to develop rules and
interpretations which generally would have had at least the effect of
enforcing on its members the principles of the Guide to Business
Standards, but it has been thwarted in its efforts by an unwillingness
on the part of the SEC to allow their adoption or, indeed, to discuss
the NASD proposal."5
So now, instead of the kind of discussion between industry and
government which has had so much constructive value, a new
philosophy seems to have emerged: let's not try to isolate and correct
abuses; let's capitalize on these to achieve an intended purpose.
If these words seem harsh, I need only refer you to the "or else"
suggestion in that part of the report dealing with reciprocal business
which states that if the Commission's proposals are not adopted,
perhaps it would be necessary to prohibit a retailer of fund shares
from acting as broker for any fund whose shares it sells, or otherwise
share in commissions arising from the fund's portfolio transactions.
46
Turning more directly to this business of give-ups, as long as
there is anything in the amount charged for executing buy and sell
orders above out-of-pocket costs, something is "given up," in effect,
to someone. Someone receives this credit above actual cost. When
it is not given up to another firm, it remains with the executing broker.
When part of it is given up to another firm, nothing essentially dif-
ferent occurs. It is simply an acknowledgment of the fact that the
person or firm who was responsible for getting the business in the
first place is entitled to some compensation, even if he, or it, did not
44 See SEC Mutual Fund Report 184.
45 See Id. at 184 n.12 for a brief summary of NASD proposed amendments to its
Rules of Fair Practice.
46 Id. at 188.
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actually execute the order on the floor of the exchange or physically
assist in its clearance.
After more than thirty-seven years in this business, it seems
strange to me that an investment company, whose function it is to
manage the assets of its shareholders, should not execute its portfolio
transactions, where possible, through qualified broker-dealers, from or
through whom the assets were received in the first place. And, unless
there is to be nothing left over above out-of-pocket costs for anyone, I
see no reason for government to interfere through some artificial re-
striction on give-ups, with management handling this business in
accordance with its best judgment.
So let's turn briefly to the amount of the commission and the
question of quantity discounts. Here, first I must say that I doubt
seriously if the price for anything we buy, in the nature of either goods
or services, is ever exactly correct, except for the sheerest coincidence.
The Stock Exchange commission on a single transaction of 100 shares
is no exception. It probably is "too high" in some cases and "too
low" in many others. But, as is said in a rather well-known com-
mercial, "We must be doing something right."
To borrow another phrase, "people's capitalism" has flourished
here to an extent that is the envy of the world. As a Canadian put
it in discussing certain of their problems relative to the insufficient
ownership by their people of companies operating in Canada,
"Capitalism without capitalists is a rather tough thing to sell."
As a fund manager, I obviously am interested in lower costs.
However, in my higher duty as a citizen, I am not in favor of changes
which may be harmful to our way of life. I want the other person to
get along, too.
Last year the total commissions paid by the fund with which I
am identified amounted to 2.2 cents per fund share outstanding, on
a weighted mean price of about $12.60. I ay this not to belittle even
2 cents a share over a twelve-month period, but rather to make the
point that whatever savings may be involved are relatively immaterial
in relation to the risk which significant reductions of cost to the
larger and more profitable accounts may create for the health of a
securities distribution system which is such an essential part of an
economy on which much of the world has come to depend.
Actually, the facts seem to raise a question whether the generally
satisfied mutual fund shareholder is the real cause of concern, or
whether the point is simply that the profits of the securities business
generally should be reduced-without, I might add, any evidence that
the change is justified.
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I'm sure some questions will be raised by this statement. I still
haven't answered the specific question, which I would be glad to do
at any time.
Recapture of Commissions Through Membership on a Regional
Exchange
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Fine. One of the statements you made
reminded me of something that Bob Loeffler alluded to yesterday. He
indicated that the management fee of the IDS sponsored funds had
been reduced by the net profit earned on the commissions paid in the
execution of portfolio transactions generated, directly or indirectly, by
the funds. Perhaps, Bob, you can elaborate on how this arrangement
works.
MR. LOEFFLER: IDS, as I mentioned earlier, distributes fund
shares exclusively through its own sales force, so we have never used
the give-up system for the purpose of supplementing income of dealers
for sales of shares. We don't distribute through dealers. Nevertheless,
IDS pays the full brokerage commissions; that is, under the exchange
rules, the funds managed by IDS have to pay the full brokerage com-
missions on all transactions executed through any of the exchanges.
In 1965, after discussions of some length with the Pacific Coast
Stock Exchange, a new subsidiary of IDS called IDS Securities Corpo-
ration, obtained a membership on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange.
Securities transactions for the funds now are handled through IDS
Securities Corporation (IDSS).
IDSS does not itself have any men on the floor of any of the
exchanges, but there are various procedures by which a portion of the
funds' commissions can be recaptured.
IDSS began operating in September of 1965 (when the member-
ship on the Pacific Coast Exchange became effective) and our proce-
dures have changed, and are still evolving. At the same time the
decision was made by IDS to try to obtain a membership on an
exchange, the decision was made that the management fee charged the
funds by IDS would be reduced by providing for a reduction equivalent
to the total net profits of IDSS resulting from the execution of the
fund portfolio transactions. This decision was later incorporated in
the contract.
There are two processes, or procedures, by which the funds' com-
missions are recouped by IDSS. One is, of course, by the direct execu-
tion on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange of security portfolio trans-
actions. This is done whenever the same execution can be obtained.
The volume of business on the Pacific Coast Exchange by IDSS has
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grown substantially since the membership was obtained. In 1966,
approxmiately 13 per cent of the funds' securities transactions were
executed on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange. When a transaction
is executed on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, it is handled through
a floor broker, and I think that approximately 30 per cent of the com-
mission is retained by the executing or clearing broker on the Ex-
change, and 70 per cent then is given-up to IDSS.
With respect to the execution of portfolio transactions on the
New York Stock Exchange, and a substantial volume of the funds'
portfolio transactions are executed on the New York Exchange (this
is a question of the availability of the shares), we go through some
of the procedures that Phil was describing earlier in order to be able
to recoup a part of the funds' commission expenses. A New York
Stock Exchange member cannot be directed to give-up any portion
of that commission to IDSS, because IDSS is not a member of the
New York Stock Exchange but only a member of the Pacific Coast
Stock Exchange. However, a New York Stock Exchange member
executing a transaction can be directed, by the funds, to give up a
portion of that commission to another New York Stock Exchange
member. Usually either the first New York Stock Exchange member,
whom I will call the executing broker, or the second one, to whom
he is directed to give-up a portion of his commission, is also a member
of the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange. In reciprocity for the business
received on the New York Stock Exchange, or for give-ups received
on New York Stock Exchange business, brokers will then, on business
which they otherwise do on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, give-up
a portion of the commissions to IDSS as a member of the Pacific
Coast Stock Exchange.
Indirectly by these procedures there comes back to IDSS some
portion of the commissions paid by the funds to the New York Stock
Exchange member firms for the executions of transactions on the
New York Stock Exchange. IDSS ultimately realizes a profit.
Monthly, the management fee is credited or reduced by an amount
equivalent to that profit. The total reduction achieved for the calendar
year 1966 came to approximately $3,100,000. So it turned out to
be a worthwhile membership.
An Alternative Recapture Arrangement-NASD Membership
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: When I explained the IDS procedure
to my students, one came up with a question to which I was not able
to give a satisfactory answer-but perhaps some of you on the panel
can. Since most of the regional exchanges permit 40 per cent give-ups
to any NASD member, wouldn't it make sense for a fund which does
834 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
regional business to create an NASD subsidiary to receive whatever
give-ups can normally be generated, and which would otherwise be
paid to brokers who sell the shares.
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: Bob, I believe there is something in the
report on that. The fund does not have to create the subsidiary broker-
dealer. Its underwriter, under the rules of many of the smaller re-
gional exchanges, can receive this amount in give-ups and credit them
to the fund under an IDS-type arrangement.47
As far as I know, that in fact is not done. Underwriters would
rather use the money for additional selling effort.
A Response to the Recapture Proposals
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: What lies behind the question is: If
an arrangement something like the IDS practice is not adopted, are
the directors adequately fulfilling their fiduciary obligations?
MR. ANDERSON: That reminds me of Voltaire's statement. I
disagree, but I'll fight to the death for your right to say it. I defend
the right of IDS to do what they did, although, in my humble opinion,
the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange made a grievous error in allowing
it to be done.
I have two comments that to me are significant, which would be
my response to your question. In the first place, if all institutional
accounts are to become their own grandpa, become their own broker,
you certainly are going to make a vast change in the structure of
our securities distribution system. I don't know how far the waves
would go, but I would assume that any brokerage firm of almost any
size would have no recourse but to have their own fund. And we
would have our own exchange membership, but I don't know who
would sell our shares, unless we were to retail them ourselves.
The other thing that confuses me relates to the conversion of a
capital account item into an income item. A commission charge is a
principal charge. If an individual buys and sells AT&T once or
twenty times, he still gets a dividend based on the dividend paid by
the company, and he has a commission that he has added to or sub-
tracted from his purchase or sales price.
Now I'm going to turn this around and assume every time we
trade a security, we make money. We earn income on that transac-
tion. And so, the more frequently you trade, the more you "earn."
These earnings would be added to the earnings from dividends.
Now, initially this develops as negative income, because an
advisory fee charge, which otherwise is reasonable, is reduced
47 SEC Mutual Fund Report 173 n.82.
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to the fund, and thereby the fund has negative income; but if you
follow this to its ultimate and logical conclusion, you would go past
that to the point where the fund had no expense and had a positive
income from its own portfolio transactions. A very low yielding
portfolio, if it was traded actively enough, could become an income
fund.
PROFESSOR MUNDrEIM: Let me ask Bob Loeffler if IDS's turn-
over increased markedly since the institution of the IDS subsidiary
corporation.
MR. LOEFFLER: Not significantly, no.
MR. LoomIs: Herb Anderson's remarks seemed to indicate at
least part of the confusion that has surrounded this problem. He
appears to feel that our objection to customer directed give-ups is a
criticism of the funds and of the fund managers, and that the fund
managers, or the NASD, or the I.C.I., should do something about it.
We don't look at it that way-at least, I don't. So long as the stock
exchange rules permit this way of doing things, I don't particularly
blame the funds for doing it, and the NASD and the I.C.I. have no
power to change the rules of the stock exchanges anyhow.
So long as the stock exchange rules permit this practice, it is to
be expected that the funds will do something with these commissions,
rather than not do anything with them. Thus, we view this as a
problem of exchange rules, not as a practice in which the funds or
their managers or the NASD or the I.C.I. are in any way delinquent.
Of course, this system does create, as the report points out, and as
Bob and I have mentioned, an incentive for funds, and perhaps for
fund salesmen, to do things which raise questions. But by and large
this is not a problem of any misconduct on the part of funds or fund
managements, but, in our view, a defect in the exchange commission
rate structure.
MR. ANDERSON: May I please just comment quickly on that?
Because this is a switch.
We in the industry see problems. We in the industry see matters
that we think should be taken care of, in the form of abuses or
potential abuses. Were that not so, the I.C.I. would not have gone
to the trouble of trying to adopt a Guide to Business Standards in this
area, nor would the NASD have tried to grab hold of what it felt were
containable, correctable abuses which, if not restrained or contained,
but allowed to go on, would put competitive pressure across the
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board on the rest of the world to do likewise. We see problems. And
we see practices we would like to see contained.
MR. LoomIs: Well, we saw problems too, and if there hadn't
been anything else that could be done about it except to endeavor to
have the NASD and the I.C.I. endeavor to contain it, that would have
been an advance. However, we thought that it would be better to
deal in a slightly different and more thorough way with the problem.
As for Bob Loeffler's explanation of how his system works, while
done for the highly desirable purpose of benefiting the fund, it does
indicate the intricacies, distortions and artificialities which this system
can create; and also it raises the problem, as Herb Anderson has men-
tioned, of creating through this aspect of the commission rate structure
an incentive for large institutions to, so to speak, move in on the
broker-dealer community. And that's another aspect which causes
concern.
EVALUATION OF THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL
TO PROHIBIT GIVE-UPS
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Gordon, I know that you have given
some thought to the question of whether or not the prohibition against
the give-up gets at the problem which Phil has been outlining, and
on which Herb Anderson and Bob Loeffler have commented.
MR. HENDERSON: I want to preface my remarks by making it
clear that I am not here as a representative of the "industry" or of
the Commission. I'm here simply as an individual expressing my own
ideas. They happen to be the same ideas I had when I was at the
Commission. If I take issue with Phil Loomis or Dick Phillips or
Morgan Shipman on some things, and if I state my position strongly,
you will understand that these are people for whom I have a great
feeling of fondness, friendship, and respect. The kind of discussion
we have been having and will be having here is the kind of discussion
we had when I was at the Commission. So, you will pardon me if
I feel I'm in the family as I express my views, and if I state them
strongly in order to communicate them.
To give you some idea of how that give and take has happened
in the past, let me go back to section 22 (d). The idea of doing away
with the price fixing aspect of 22(d) was an idea that I generated.
I came in one day to Bob and a couple of the other fellows who
are in the audience, and I said: I think this may be a good idea.
While I don't myself feel that the 82 per cent load is a great problem,
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why wouldn't it nonetheless be in the public interest, and not really
harmful to anybody, to do away with the price fixing at the retail end
of this business, to open up retail competition similar to that which
exists in the automobile and appliance industries. We have to protect
the underwriter, so that people can't bypass the underwriter and cause
him to pay the expense of preparing prospectuses, without being paid
for it. But if we do that, why isn't this a good idea?
And the response was: that's a bad idea. So we sat down and
spent a long time arguing the pros and cons of this idea. And some
of the con arguments were: that doing away with 22(d) would
give an artificial advantage, perhaps, to the captive sales force funds;
that we really don't need to change 22(d) to protect investors, since
there are no-load and closed-end funds available; and, that doing
away with 22(d) might hurt small broker-dealer firms.
So the discussion went on, and I was finally persuaded by the
arguments against it, and I still am. So we have had give and take,
and now we are going to have some more as we get into the
reciprocal area.
The Basic Problem-Conflict of Interest
What is bothering the Commission in the reciprocal area is a
problem of conflict of interest. Let me try to define this problem as
the Commission sees it. It is this: brokerage commissions can be
used to help fund sales; fund sales help the fund manager more than
the fund shareholder; but the cost of brokerage hurts the fund share-
holder more than the fund manager (because the additional cost to
the fund, which the shareholder bears, will probably not affect 'per-
formance enough to reduce sales). Thus there is an incentive created
for the fund manager to misuse fund brokerage for his own benefit
to the possible detriment of the fund shareholder.
Various practices have developed in the reciprocal business area
which are very troublesome. I do not feel about the reciprocal area
the way I feel about the sales load. I feel that reciprocal business is a
real problem area. I don't have any question about that. My only
question is: what is the best way to address the problems which exist
in this area.
Response That Commission Proposals Are Partial Solutions
The Commission has recommended the administrative remedy of
reforming the stock exchange commission rate structure by outlawing
customer-directed cash give-ups and imposing a volume discount. Un-
838 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Voi.115:769
fortunately, I have troubles with these proposals and the reasons given
to support them, as well as the side effects the proposals might have.
For example, the Commission states that one of the bad aspects
of the practice of allocating brokerage business as a reward for sales
is that this practice gives the broker-dealer an incentive to push a
particular mutual fund on the basis of the amount of brokerage it
gives rather than on the basis of investment merit. But the Com-
mission's proposals, while they might reduce the amount of available
reciprocal, would not really eliminate this aspect of the reciprocal
business problem. There would still be room for this kind of practice.
The report indicates that one of the problems with reciprocal
business is that it gives a fund an incentive to use more brokers for
its transactions than is warranted from the point of view of obtaining
the most efficient execution. But the give-up device is, of course, a
means of solving this problem without difficulty to the fund. Banning
the give-up will not solve and can only aggravate this problem.
The report indicates that the present pattern of brokerage alloca-
tion favors large funds over small funds, because large funds have.
more reciprocal to allocate for sales than do small funds. However,
the volume discount may favor big funds over small funds, since the
big funds may be able to appeal to investors on the ground that their
net brokerage cost may be cheaper. In addition, it seems likely that
the big funds will still have more brokerage available for sales than
will the small funds. So this problem will not be solved.
The report indicates that present practices favor NYSE firms
over other firms. However, I believe the Commission's proposals will
increase rather than reduce this disparity. A volume discount should
strengthen the NYSE and its members relative to other markets and
other brokers. And the banning of give-ups and a requirement of a
volume discount should favor the big NYSE firms relative to the
smaller firms. The big NYSE firms will probably do most of the
fund executions.
Adoption of a volume discount may also have an adverse effect
on small individual investors. The smaller investor presently pays
the same stock exchange commission for round lots as the largest
investor. With a single commission rate, the exchange can't increase
the cost to the smaller investor without equally increasing the cost
to the bigger investor. This may provide more adequate practical
protection for the smaller investor than SEC regulation. The proposal
for a volume discount would remove this protection for the smaller
investor. This protection is bartered for a reduction in brokerage costs
for the large institutional investors. These are the investors who are
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supposed to be best able to fend for themselves without government
assistance. The emphasis here seems out of focus.
The report indicates, as a reason for outlawing the give-up, that
the cash give-up is a "rebate." This conclusion is debatable, however,
since the concept of a rebate relates to the kind of service which can
be purchased with the commission dollar, rather than to the manner
in which such service can be purchased through the commission dollar:
An additional problem is that if the volume discount is forced
on the exchanges by Commission action rather than through the
effect of competitive forces, the Commission will be, once again, as in
the case of the 5 per cent sales load, in the position of trying to make
determinations for which adequate objective standards do not exist.
What is the right kind of volume discount? How does one tell?
So I have problems with some of the reasons given for the Com-
mission's proposals and some of the side effects the proposals may have.
As the report points out, however, it is true that the basic conflict
of interest in the fund brokerage area can have adverse consequences
for fund shareholders. It can lead to possible churning of the port-,
folio; prevent consummation of favorable transactions that might take
place absent reciprocal pressures; cause consummation of unfavorable
transactions that would not take place but for reciprocal pressures;
cause executions to be handled in a more expensive or inefficient way
than otherwise would be the case; and lead to give-ups and inter-
positioning on over-the-counter transactions.
How do the Commission's proposals solve these basic conflict-of-
interest problems? The answer is that the proposals do not really
eliminate these conflicts, though they may tend to reduce the dollar
impact of them. They are, if you will, like a birth control pill which
is not designed to stop conception but is designed simply to guarantee
that one will have smaller babies.
I have a basic concern about that kind of remedy. What is likely
to happen with such a program is that during the first year people
are going to say "Look at those little babies. See how little they are."
But the next year someone is going to say "Oh-oh, look at that.
Quintuplets!" And the following year people may begin to mutter
"You know, I don't think the babies we are getting today are as little
as they used to be." And so consideration may finally be given to
a remedy that is designed to do a more complete job.
Now, as Herb Anderson mentioned, the report in fact warns
that if the banning of give-ups and adoption of a volume discount
doesn't solve these conflict of interest problems adequately, considera-
tion will have to be given to a more direct remedy.
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Alternative Proposals
In my judgment, we ought to look now at some of the possible
alternatives. Possibly, the drawbacks of adopting one of these will be
less than the drawbacks which are inherent in the Commission's
proposals.
The most obvious alternative would be a rule to the effect that
managers of mutual fund complexes could not allocate portfolio busi-
ness to brokers who act as retail dealers for the funds in their complex.
Thus, brokers would be required to choose some funds which they
could serve as brokers, and others which they could sell. Variations
on this would include permitting a limited amount of brokerage to go
to brokers who also act as retailers, and making possible exceptions
for floor brokerage.
Another basic alternative might be to require that portfolio
brokerage, which is allocated to a retail dealer, result in a correspond-
ing rebate or reduction in the portion of the sales load otherwise
allocable to such dealer.
All such alternatives have their own difficulties and drawbacks.
There isn't time to discuss them in depth today. But what I am sug-
gesting is that it might be wise to explore these now, since it is
possible this will have to be done eventually anyway.
PRoFEssoR MUNDHEIM: You have given us some alternatives to
think about. I hope they stimulate some comment.
May I start at the far left of the table with Morgan, and work
my way around?
Volume Discounts
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: Many of Gordon's points are quite per-
ceptive and illuminate the complexity of a number of the problems
the Commission faces. I have several comments.
The question of volume discounts is one that pertains to all in-
stitutional and large investors; and the Commission has viewed this, I
think, as closely related to the give-up problem, but separable from it,
and something which will be examined after the give-up problem.
Also, the relationship of a volume discount to the small investor
is perplexing, because a volume discount to, for example, an IDS-
sponsored fund, a very large and sophisticated investor, is given to
some of the smallest investors in the country. Thus, you are not
necessarily discriminating against small investors when you give a
volume discount to large investors. But I think the Commission has
wisely put volume discounts on a list of projects to reach after the
give-up problem.
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The directed give-up goes to the fundamental integrity of the
commission rate structure. The power of the exchanges, recently
confirmed in court,48 to fix rates as a direct exception to the antitrust
laws, is based on the premise that the Commission will discharge its
oversight duties. The directed give-up practice lacks rationality;
it is illogical to have a fixed commission rate structure, and yet allow
a large percentage of the commission to be directed elsewhere. Rather
fortuitously, the directed give-up is of most benefit to the underwriters
of mutual funds.
Concerning Gordon's far less conservative solutions on brokerage
disaffiliation, or crediting the amounts to the fund itself, I disagree.
It's a matter of philosophy, but I believe that the Commission acted
responsibly and correctly when it concluded: let's try conservative
reforms before we consider rather radical changes in the structure of
the industry. But let me say that it was a very thoughtful presentation
concerning many complex problems that the Commission and the in-
dustry will be dealing with over the next few years.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Bob, do you have some comments on
the recommendation to prohibit give-ups? Or maybe you would prefer
to comment on a related question sent up from the floor. It asks: why
don't large funds, like IDS, get together, and instead of utilizing
roundabout ways of getting what is in effect a volume discount-lean
hard on the Commission and the exchanges, to effect that kind of
result directly?
You can take your choice as to which one you want to answer.
MR. LOEFFLER: To begin with, it took a little bit of leaning to
obtain the membership on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange. It was
not received, necessarily, with enthusiasm from all quarters.
I would like to comment, however, that I personally never re-
garded it as necessarily such a novelty. IDS is, after all, a registered
broker-dealer. We found that it did not seem to be an uncommon
practice for some members of the New York Stock Exchange engaged
in the brokerage business, and who also have investment advisory
services, sometimes to credit against their advisory charge a portion
of the commissions on the transactions that were executed for advisory
accounts pursuant to their recommendation. So we did not think
that what we were doing was very novel.
I was appalled when I first got involved in this to discover the
complexities of the rituals which we have to go through to achieve a
given objective. But I also became enormously impressed with the
4s Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., CCH FED. SEc. L. REi. ff 91,864 (7th Cir. Jan. 4,
1967).
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delicacy with which you have to maneuver and make changes in this
area, to make sure you don't disrupt all kinds of practices, many of
which can be justified historically.
The Argument That the Commission's Proposals Are Too Broad
My concern with the Commission's recommendations is that they
seem to have become very concerned about a specific practice which
they regard as an evil-the use or diversion of brokerage by one means
or another to supplement sales commissions. Whether or not it is an
evil is another matter.
I am concerned because the Commission, disturbed by one particu-
lar practice, has attacked it with a shotgun instead of a rifle, and I
am somewhat concerned at the peripheral consequences which may
come from that approach.
The reason for concern from IDS's standpoint, is that, while we
have managed to devise our own method for solving our problems, we
are dependent upon the continued existence of a healthy securities
industry. I am troubled by potential consequences, yet unknown and
unforeseen and perhaps not fully explored, which might result from
this approach of using a shotgun to shoot a rabbit.
PROFESSOR M-UNDHEIM: If you had the rifle, at what would you
shoot? What does the rabbit look like, or is the proper question:
what does the rifle look like?
MR. LOEFFLER: As I understand from the Commission report
and from discussions which I have had with members of the staff
from time to time, it seems that the specific thing which bothers the
Commission the most, and which they wished to get at, is the use of
give-ups to supplement sales commissions. That's a specific single
thing, but when they take the approach of abolishing give-ups, that's
somewhat akin to Fred Brown's comment of yesterday: in order to
get at a few bad drivers on the road, we're going to close the road.
I'm just not sure that the shotgun approach is necessary. Maybe
I misinterpret all of the potential practices which the Commission wants
to get at, but it seemed to me it is letting one practice dictate their
entire approach.
PROFESSOR MUNDHElIM: Let me move on to Herb, and then Phil.
MR. ANDERSON: Well, I made a little note as I was thinking
along with all these discussions, that it would be very helpful if we
could separate principles from practices. If every activity in life were
to be banned because of abuses, we wouldn't have much left.
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There's one other little observation that I would like to make that
has occurred to me all through these proceedings. In all friendliness
and good humor, the attorneys insist you can't practice law without
being trained in the law, and, as a matter of fact, if you try it, you'll
end up in the courts.
But they seem to have very few inhibitions about practicing in
our area. And I would tie that in, actually, Phil, with your comment
that perhaps some things have been going on that you were not
aware of.
Believe me, they have. And, believe me, we know what they are.
As a matter of fact, however, they are not all bad. I wasn't objecting
to lawyers coming into business. I was commenting that lawyers not
in business seem quite uninhibited in deciding how the business can
and should be run.
Volume Discounts
Now, let me make a few businessman's observations here. The
bleeding hearts talk about the disadvantage to the little fund of quantity
discounts, and say it would give the larger fund a great advantage.
Well, I happen to have been interested in this particular area, among
other things, and a portfolio turnover ratio that is ten times more in
one fund than in another is by no means uncommon. And so you
would have no problem-in fact, you might pity some large funds
like the mammoth $32 billion fund represented by Bob Loeffler-
because if they have a relatively low turnover, which I suspect they
probably do-say, ten per cent-it only takes a $350 million fund with
a 100 per cent turnover to match them.
This raises another point which, as a businessman, confuses me.
I was delighted to see that the SEC at least was aware that the quan-
tity discount should not be in such a form that it interfered with
proper execution as would the one-stock, one-day, one-broker sug-
gestion made some time ago which, obviously, is nuts.
So, okay, you go to a period-the longer the period, the better:
three months, six months, one year. There is still a conflict of in-
terest and a basis for criticizing the fund. If it doesn't qualify, it is
deliberately avoiding the break point; if it does qualify, it is churning.
Each of us has his own philosophy and his own approach.
Speaking for our approach, we do not have a high portfolio turnover,
and yet there are years in which we have a much higher, and in other
years a much lower turnover; so, we presumably would be falling in
and out of bed, depending on where this break point came. And I sus-
pect that there would be a disposition to avoid falling out of bed, so
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that there might be more transactions which in the long run could
conceivably cost the investor more.
One final point: the New York Stock Exchange members are
the "fat calves." They get most of this dough. But get back to
fundamentals; they are members of the New York Stock Exchange,
and the order is executed on the New York Stock Exchange because
that's where the primary market is, and thereby they get the commis-
sion incidental to the execution of the order. They put up a fair
amount of money for their seat. They subject themselves to much
more in the way of capital requirements, supervision, etc. than other
brokers. And so, much as I love everybody, including the non-
member firms, I say that the nonmemebrs are not eligible to get what-
ever the commission is. Thank you.
PROFESSOR MUNDREIM: It might be useful to point out that the
London Stock Exchange has a volume discount. Apparently institu-
tions there have been able to live with it, without, as you suggest,
falling in and out of bed. Phil?
The Commission Staff's Reply
MR. LoomIs: Well, there have been a good many comments.
As to Gordon Henderson's, I agree with Morgan Shipman's
remarks. Gordon's analysis is very interesting and perceptive and
it merits consideration. I am not prepared at the moment to suggest
that we should go so far as to prohibit dealers who sell shares from
executing portfolio transactions. It seems to me that that is unduly
drastic.
Also, his discussion emphasizes this as a problem of mutual fund
management, while I am inclined, as I have said-and I may be
heretical here-to regard it a little more as a problem of stock
exchange commission structure of a reasonable and rational character.
As to Mr. Loeffler's rifle, I still didn't hear him identify either
the rabbit or the rifle, but if I understand him, he is saying that we
should endeavor to prohibit give-ups when used as a reward for
sales, but not otherwise. In the first place, I'm not sure of that as a
matter of principle, but even if I were, I would hate to try to ad-
minister and enforce such a suggestion, because how am I going to
know why the give-up went to a firm that both negotiated sales and
provided research and did all the other things that it does?
There is a problem here, which is a legitimate source of concern
to the New York Stock Exchange, which has not been touched upon:
the impact on competition among exchanges, and the use of give-up
practices which diverts business from the primary market. I cannot
see why it should be said that prohibiting the directed give-up would
[Vol.l15:769
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in any way hurt the Third Market. Rather the reverse would seem
more probable to me, because one reason the Third Market has not
received as much mutual fund business as they would like, and perhaps
as their capacities deserve, is that they can't give give-ups.
MR. HENDERSON: I think, as to the Third Market, Phil, it is the
volume discount which would have the biggest effect.
MR. LooMIs: I was addressing myself to the give-up problem.
I recognize that the volume discount is far more complex.
I can sympathize with Herb Anderson, who has been patient
with lawyers interfering in his business, but I'm afraid the Com-
mission has to do so every now and then. That's what we were
created for, and we welcome his guidance.
MR. GRANT: The question of reciprocal is not one about which
I am particularly competent to speak, and I thought it would be
appropriate to thank my fellow panelists for the lessons I have learned
today. The only thing that I find disurbing is that they are about
to change the rules at a time when people in our position, who are
not members of stock exchange firms, are learning how to apply them.
As a matter of fact, as I indicated before, our primary interest
is in whatever the sales commission yields. This reminds me of a
little story I heard, which I think may be appropriate, about the
chicken and the pig walking down the street side by side looking for
a place to eat. They saw a sign in a restaurant, "Ham and eggs,"
and the chicken said, "Why don't we go in here for a bite?" The pig
said: "I don't think so. I don't think I'd particularly like to eat in
that place. To you it represents only an investment, but to me it's
a total commitment." That sums up our commitment to this industry
at this moment.
Policing the Prohibition Against Give-Ups
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: A question sent up from the floor probes
an important aspect of prohibition of give-ups. It asks whether the
proposed ban on give-ups will not simply induce funds to spread
executions among more brokers, thus leaving the ultimate compensa-
tion the same as it is now, but undoubtedly resulting in poorer execu-
tions for the funds? It appropriately raises the question of policing
and administering the prohibition on give-ups. Won't it be relatively
easy for funds to use (and justify the use of) fewer lead brokers than
they do now?
MR. LoomIs: There might be some of that, as the Commission
mentions in its report. On the other hand, the investment company
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managers have an obligation, of which they are well aware, to obtain
the best executions, and to split orders to any major extent would
raise a problem for them.
Particularly, I have heard it said that they would divide an order
among six brokers, and have the six brokers bidding against each
other. I can't conceive that this would go on. In any event, some
of the distortions and maneuvers would be out.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Herb?
MR. ANDERSON: I have a brief comment.
Until rather recently we used the lead broker concept very little,
because we felt that even though the broker, Joe Doakes of Minne-
apolis, would make no more if we used his correspondent, there was
a value to Doakes in his correspondent receiving the business, rather
than a lead broker. We have now come to use the lead broker concept
more, but here you get, in my opinion, to another matter; namely,
the philosophy and the policies of the fund.
I would imagine-I couldn't speak for them, but I would
imagine-that a so-called performance fund, which moves actively in
fair amounts in and out of the market, would find it extremely difficult
to spread its orders. On the other hand, we don't operate that
way. We typically like to accommodate the public on a rather
leisurely basis. When everybody wants a stock, we like to accom-
modate them and let them have it, and when nobody wants it, why, we
like to accommodate them and give them a place to sell. This
philosophy typically prefers an average of the market, because we are
not that sure that the stock is perfectly priced at any precise point, and
that we should either grab it on the buy side or throw it out on the
sell side.
With this philosophy, which probably goes back to what we did
until recently, I think we would have relatively little problem in, to
use your own words, "spreading our business" over a number of
brokers, using their own structure of correspondent relationships in
New York.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Can you, for example, send an order
through Broker A whom you know uses a particular correspondent and
thus be assured of the quality of the execution? That would seem to
me the same as sending the order to the correspondent in the first
place and having him give up to Broker A. If there is an under-
standing with respect to the broker who actually performs the execu-
tion, haven't you got the present system? Would those arrangements
be prohibited?
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MR. ANDERSON: I was delighted to hear Phil say that he didn't
fully understand Mr. Funston's letter, because I didn't either, and Phil
is much smarter than I am in that area.
The answer at the moment is that nobody knows. It's a matter
still to be resolved.
MR. LoomIs: I think that is probably a fair appraisal.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Since we are getting close to the end
of the day, let me ask if any of you have anything further to add in
the reciprocal business area?
The Advantages of the Commission Proposal
MR. PHiLLips: I've gotten the impression from the discussion
here that almost everybody agrees that there are problems in this area,
and problems that need solution.
I think that it's also fair to say that they are complex problems,
and that there is no one solution or combination of solutions that pro-
vides complete assurance of dealing with every facet of them.
But while there has been a lot of criticism of the Commission's
suggestions on the ground that they are not perfect, it seems pretty
clear also that no one has the perfect rifle to deal with these problems.
The Commission's proposals, I think, offer a very reasonable
hope of cutting down the pressures in this area to a manageable size.
They also offer an advantage, because they deal with the problems
where they start-with exchange rules and a commission rate structure
that do not reflect the needs of a securities market which is increasingly
influenced by institutional investors, who invest the savings of many
small investors. They are directed at give-up rules which grew out
of a commission rate structure which provides no volume discount for
the very large orders.
The abolition of the customer directed give-up, coupled with a
volume discount, offers a great deal of promise for the resolution of
the problems; not complete, but, hopefully, reasonably complete.
The criticisms that have been directed against these proposals
and the inability to come up with alternatives reflect an awareness of
the complexity of the problems. I would be frank to admit that the
Commission was at this stage in its thinking some time ago. It con-
sidered the alternatives-I believe, every one of them that has been men-
tioned here-and concluded that the combination of abolition of the
give-up and the volume discount represents the clearest and most
direct attack on the problems.
If anyone has a better rifle, we'd like to hear about it.
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MR. ANDERSON: I would like to comment that I don't think
there is any admission of inability at all, except possibly on the part
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. I would like to see
medication tried, rather than euthenasia. Don't kill the patient; just
try to correct any illnesses that exist.
PROFESSOR MUNDIH[EIM: I think Dick would like you to read the
contents on the label of your medication. He would like some specifics.
What things do you want to see done in order to correct the abuses
that you see, and that you said the industry sees?
MR. ANDERSON: If anybody could recite the problem and describe
the cures in the short time left, it would be a miracle. Furthermore,
I think it's highly inappropriate to have a public discussion of what
may be evils, because some of these evils are a matter of opinion, others
are a matter of intent.
I think there could be meaningful discussions, as with this little
Statement of Policy that, skipping the preamble, comprises less than
three pages. I happened to be on the committee which hammered
that out with the SEC, and it took us weeks and weeks and weeks
to find a solution, and we apparently did fairly well. I can tell you
a few things that are wrong with it, but we did fairly well. I have
not heard criticism generally of the sales material of the business-
and this is now 1967, and the original Statement of Policy was dated
1950.49
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Bob?
MR. LOEFFLER: I'm just throwing this out for consideration, but
I sometimes wonder if there is not too much reluctance on the part
of the Commission to assume that if they declare a certain practice
to be improper, men will be honest and observe that declaration of
policy; and if there is a culprit, it will not be impossible to prove.
Let me be a little more specific. I'm not recommending this;
I'm just throwing it out.
If you say that the specific evil at which the Commission wants to
shoot a rifle is the use of give-ups for rewarding sales, or supplement-
ing, in effect, a commission on sales of mutual fund shares, and if it
were to be determined that that is a practice which should be prohibited,
the Commission simply should declare, in general terms, that it is
a prohibited practice.
Now, I think there is a reluctance on the part of the Commission
to assume that 99 and some-odd hundredths per cent of the people
4) Statement of Policy, s=pra note 44.
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involved are going to be honest and are going to observe the rule, and
also assume it will not be impossible to prove the case against the
occasional violator.
This is perhaps what I meant in terms of the rabbit and the rifle.
Now, I'm not saying that the practice is evil. That I don't know
or in any event I have no particular view on it at the moment. On the
other hand, the Commission's approach concerns me because of the
consequences.
I can't resist the story I heard about the chap who decided to do
something about air pollution, so he equipped an automobile to run by
electricity, and set off from San Diego to Los Angeles. In due course,
he arrived, having proved that (1) you could do it with an electric
automobile, and (2) that the prime cost of the electricity was only
$3.25. On the other hand, it cost him $17,000 for extension cords.
MR. HENDERSON: As I said before, I don't think there is any
question that there is a problem in this area. I am inclined to think
that failing to recognize the problem is not going to make it go away.
If you want to find examples of the problem, there are many places
to look. The Special Study had lots of them. The report has them,
and I would even suggest that you look at Keith Funston's letter
dealing with the give-up problem. I opened it up at random just
now, and find these two sentences:
Similar practice has arisen in the over-the-counter
market. Some member firms keep a running total of com-
missions earned on over-the-counter trades and give up fifty
per cent of those commissions to NASD members at the direc-
tion of institutional customers.
Doesn't that speak for itself? There are bad things going on in
this area. There are real problems, and I think, really, the only
proper area of discussion is: are there good answers? And, if so,
which are the best?
THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL ON REGIONAL EXCHANGES
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: One aspect of the proposed prohibition
on give-ups relates to its impact on the regional exchanges. We
have one here in Philadelphia, and I have heard some dire predic-
tions of what will happen. It will not survive. Has the Commission
concluded that, on reflection, the regional exchanges don't serve a
useful function? Or do you see the prohibition of give-ups as a way
of forcing the regional exchanges to become competitive with the
New York Stock Exchange in other ways, in order to survive.
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MR. LoomIs: If you are addressing that question to me, it is my
belief that there certainly will be an impact on the regional exchanges.
It will vary from exchange to exchange. I would suppose that the
impact would cause the regional exchanges to revert to their original
function-to provide local markets for local securities, and for New
York Stock Exchange listed securities where a local market is needed.
There are other ways in which the regional exchanges could make
themselves more competitive.
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: Bob, I agree with Phil. The impact will
be significant, and the Comnmission undoubtedly will have to consider
the impact and take it into account in fashioning give-up rules.
The impact on many regional exchanges will be large, because
in the past three years the great discovery of many of the regional
exchanges has been that they can flower by adopting very liberal
give-up rules. A banning of directed give-ups might put the regionals
back where they were a few years ago.
What Role For the Regional Exchanges?
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: What ways do you see that the regional
exchanges ought to be competing? How can they effectively do that?
What's your program for their survival?
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: Their original purpose was to provide
local markets for local stocks and some dually traded stocks. The
Special Study covered in some detail the work of the regional ex-
changes.5" Many innovations have indeed come from the biggest
regional exchanges, rather than the New York exchanges.
The furor in New York City over tax increases and proposed tax
increases makes it important that some viable exchanges outside of
New York City remain available, so that there will be a counter-
pressure against taxation of the remainder of the country for the
privilege of having electronic impulses flow to New York City. Some
regionals have considerable value as innovators in trading techniques,
and bookkeeping and clearing procedures-the Midwest Stock Ex-
change has been a leader there. The innovation and competition they
provide in that way are valuable and must be given appropriate weight
by the Commission.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Would you look to them, for example,
to provide competition through leadership in arriving at various ways
of structuring volume discounts, or, to take another example, in pro-
viding different price structures for executing odd-lot transactions?
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FINANCING OF SALES
PROFESSOR SHIPMAN: On volume discounts, I have little to say.
I have not studied the current possibilities and data in any detail. The
Commission's mid-1966 proposal indicated that perhaps a volume
discount might be keyed to total volume on all the exchanges.5 The
structuring of a volume discount will be important to the regionals.
Changes in odd-lot structures are a possibility.
MR. P~n~mrps: I'm not sure if I misunderstood you or not,
Morgan, but the Commission's report expressly says that a volume
discount does not have to be uniform for all exchanges, and it does
leave the way open for competition for business in the form of volume
discounts.'
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
PROFESSOR MUNDH3EIM: Gordon, one question from the floor
seeks to explore one of your alternative solutions. It reads:
"How would Gordon Henderson prevent the use of brokerage
commissions or give-ups from being used to pay for services supplied
through an investment adviser ?" I take it this refers to the alternatives
which would limit the amount of reciprocal business which a fund
can do with particular brokers.
MR. HENDERSON: Well, I think, to make a system like this
work, you would have to have a strict rule, so that you could not give
brokerage to a retail dealer in fund shares and label that brokerage
for investment advice or brokerage for best block executions, or
something else; and then leave up for grabs the question of whether
this really was for investment advice or really was for good bloc
executions, instead of sales. I think the rule, to be workable, to be
meaningful, has to be a rigid one, in that you just simply cannot give
brokerage for any reason whatsoever, more than X amount or more
than X percentage of sales, to a retail dealer firm.
Someone asked me during the coffee break: well, how would you
do this where, for example, you had used up your limit, or your alloca-
tion for a particular firm and you suddenly wanted to do a secondary,
and they are the best people to do it. What would happen?
I said: well, I think, obviously, you would have to have some
kind of a carry-over arrangement to provide some flexibility; but
in the end such a rule would inevitably have some bite to it; there
would be some interference with the present execution procedures, some
interference with the obtaining of investment advice. There is no ques-
6' 112 CoNG. Rxc. 17,061-63 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1966).
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tion about it. But, I think, to answer that specific question, the rules
to be effective would have to be relatively rigid, as they are, for
example, in the law of trusts where conflicts of interest are involved.
MR. ANDERSON: What would you do after you had used it up for
everybody, and needed a carry-forward?
MR. HENDERSON: Well, you would of course have to have some
primary executing brokers, Herb, who are going to handle most of
your business and who are not selling your shares.
MR. LOEFFLER: This is not much of a contribution, but sitting
here I have been developing a great deal of sympathy for the view-
point which Herb expressed earlier.
It must be an awful thing for businessmen to sit and listen to
a group of lawyers figuring out ways procedurally to stereotype a
method of doing business. What always concerns me is that stereo-
typing has a straight-jacket effect, a tendency to prohibit and re-
strain the innovation and change which normally comes from the new
ideas and the interplay of business and economic forces. I think
I tend to have a much greater faith in the development of competitive
forces and the normal interplay of economic influences than has
generally been expressed.
MR. ANDERSON: Could I just briefly give you an Alice in
Wonderland thought that runs through my mind?
We are going to prohibit, now, placing any commission business
with brokers that sell our shares. Well, I can envisage getting
together with the head of some fund in the business that I think well
of, and we'd swap dealers. His dealers would get our brokerage
business, and our dealers would get his brokerage business, and it's
kind of a weird way of working your way around through life-
MR. HENDERSON: Herb, that's a very interesting idea, but Bob
Loeffler said a little while ago that if you just established rules and
told people what the right rules were, you ought to be able to trust
them to abide by them.
MR. LOEFFLER: I also expressed a faith in the ability of the
Commission to prove the case against the occasional violator.
MR. HENDERSON: Well, you see, on this one I tend to think most




MR. PHILLIPS: This interchange illustrates the reasons why the
Commission did not take the positions that Gordon Henderson has
suggested-either of his two alternatives. It's a question whether they
are really enforceable, and, worst of all, they put the government in
the position of circumscribing the businessman's judgment.
But the solution suggested by the Commission would not have
that effect; nor is this a question, like Mr. Loeffler suggested, of
leaving it to the forces of competition. This is a problem that arises
from the exchange rules and not from the forces of competition alone.
It's the interaction between the competition for sales in the mutual
fund industry and exchange rules, which were adopted in a wholly
different market context and for wholly different purposes. The
result has been anomalies in the commission rate structure which give
rise to a lot of excess brokerage.
Now, to suggest that you tell mutual fund managers that they
can't use this brokerage for sales, and to suggest that they have got to
waste it, because they have no other use for it, just doesn't make
sense. I don't think people voluntarily obey rules that don't make
sense.
So we then get into the situation where there are circumstances
reported to the Commission which suggest a violation of our rule, and
it commences an investigation, and perhaps it can't prove it, contrary
to Mr. Loeffler's suggestion that it should be able to; but, in any
event, the man who is being investigated gets very upset about this
investigation, and the Commission then ends up interfering with his
future business judgment since he bends over backward to avoid any
appearance of wrongdoing.
I don't think that any of the alternatives are feasible or adequate
to deal with the problem, because they ignore the fact that the problem
stems from exchange rules and the commission rate structure. It's
those rules that have to be modified, and modified in a way that does
not circumscribe the business judgment of the fund managers.
The Commission does not want to tell fund managers how to
execute transactions, and its suggestions, in my view, represent the
kind of approach that would least interfere with the exercise of business
judgment in the management of funds.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: It's interesting that you say that the
problem is in the commission rate structure. The report curiously
attacks the give-up question first, and leaves the commission rate
structure as the second item for attack.
854 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:769
Although at first blush that seems silly, it might be the sensible
way to handle the problem. The Commission's approach may unleash
new forces and new pressures which in themselves eventually, indirectly
may help to break down the commission rate structure. That attack
is one which I suppose for many good reasons the Commission may
not be willing to make directly at this juncture.
MR. PHiLLIPS: The fact is that attacking give-ups is simple, and
devising a volume discount or an institutional discount is a very
complex job. If we could do the volume discount first, we would be
pleased to do it, but we have to develop an approach to these problems,
and we can't wait until we get into a position where we can do every-
thing at one time. This is not a static industry, and it's not a static
problem. The problem becomes more difficult to resolve the longer
you wait because people become dependent upon this source of com-
pensation. They make business decisions, open up branch offices and
hire large research departments on an expectation of business which
will come through the existing commission rate structure. Then
their dependence on that commission rate structure is heightened.
I think these are serious questions, and a start to a solution has
to be made. It's not a question of waiting until we find a perfect
solution, but let's approach this problem step by step until we can
devise an exchange commission rate structure and exchange rules
that reflect what is happening-the growing institutionalization of the
securities markets.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I think it is time to close this conference.
One thing that this afternoon's discussion ought to illustrate, as I
hope, much of the discussion which we have had in the last two days
illustrates, is that the problems which exist are of enormous complexity.
Sometimes you have to sit around and talk about them and examine
them from all sides to realize how complex the problems are and how
many ramifications the solutions have.
On the other hand, I hope that some of you who came with the
idea that there were no problems, only a large number of biases of
various kinds, have been disabused of that notion; and, having been
disabused, perhaps we can all go back and do some useful thinking,
and perhaps come up with some additional alternatives, which I suspect
that you, Phil, and you, Dick, and you, Frank, will be delighted to
hear. So thank you, and let's adjourn.
